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Abstract  
 
As national consciousness was developing within the Cypriot society, the 
traditional tolerance towards the ‘other’ was gradually but firmly replaced by fear, 
threat and eventually enmity. The role of the religious institutions, the interests of local 
elite intelligentsia, the economic inequality and the nationalist factions from Greece and 
Turkey, all contributed to the alienation between the communities of Greek Cypriots 
and Turkish Cypriots. The old bonds and the new shared social structures, such as trade 
unions, did not succeed in transforming the society on grounds other than religion and 
divisive nationalist ideologies. 
The spirit of cooperation was largely prevented by the British colonial rule 
established from 1878 until 1960. The intransigence of the colonial policies triggered 
the prevalence of the radical elements. When the weakened British presence in the 
region was reaching its ending in the 1950’s, the instigation of outside powers for 
involvement in the island’s domestic affairs culminated in the clash of the two 
competing nationalisms and the ensuing institutionalisation of the division. 
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Preface 
This dissertation was written as part of the MA in Black Sea and Eastern 
Mediterranean Studies at the International Hellenic University.  
The general objective of this thesis is to outline the internal and external dynamics 
that affected the relationship between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots 
during the British rule from 1878 until 1960. A special focus is placed on the first 
decades of the British administration until the annexation of the island in 1914. The 
events during the 1950’s until the Independence at the end of the decade played a 
pivotal role in the political and diplomatic history of the island. Yet, the foundations of 
the problematic construction of the Cypriot identity lay in the past.  
As it has often been pointed out by many scholars, the case of Cyprus is not 
unique. The British rule until 1960 was rather typical of a colonial empire in the Middle 
East. Following the collapse of the Ottomans and the instigation by the European 
colonial powers, the Eastern Mediterranean peoples introduced the doctrine of 
nationalism for the cohesion of the diverse ethnic groups towards the building of a 
nation and the legitimacy of national self-government. The peculiarity in the case of 
Cyprus relates to the fact that the aspiration of the island’s majority community for self-
determination involved unification with another state and not independence. The 
evolution of this ideology was vulnerable to marginalization and to high risk of failure. 
The interventions of outside powers, as well as the perceptions these interventions have 
generated among the local population fuelled the complexity of the relationship between 
the two communities. 
The first chapter describes the impact of the British administration on Cyprus 
during the first decades. It contains the transitional stage and the first changes on the 
most important aspects of public life (legislation, language, education and the socio-
economic developments).  
The second chapter elaborates the rise of Greek Cypriot nationalism by placing 
emphasis on two fundamental components of this evolution. The first one relates to the 
ethnarchic role of the Church of Cyprus and the importance of retaining this role under 
the British domination. The second factor is the idea of enosis. The ideology of 
unification with Greece and its impact on the ensuing sociopolitical developments until 
1960 are discussed as expression of irredentist ideology and as political leverage in 
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Cypriot history. The chapter concludes with reference to the effect of Greece’s 
participation in the First World War on Greek Cypriot national aspirations. 
In chapter three the critical junctions for the rise of Turkish Cypriot nationalism 
are attempted to be identified. The rise of Turkish Cypriot nationalism against the 
enosis movement remains incomprehensible unless the Turkish nationalism is explored. 
From the Young Turks movement to the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the 
presentation of the fundamental principles of this evolution provides a fuller 
understanding of Greek - Turkish relations and reveals the historical and psychological 
foundations of the two competing nationalisms in Cyprus. The brief reference to the 
Great War and the regional environment until the Treaty of Lausanne sheds light to the 
perspective of the rising geopolitical importance of Cyprus and Turkey’s subsequent 
involvement. Within this context, the reaction to these developments within the Turkish 
Cypriot community consist the last part of this chapter.  
Following the presentation of the ideological pillars of both nationalisms in 
Cyprus within their historical framework, chapter four describes the continuation of the 
British colonial rule in the island from the beginning of the twentieth century until 1950, 
with underlying focus on the structural sociopolitical changes that affected the two 
Cypriot communities, their relationship and the British involvement in that process. The 
growing inter-communal tensions, the impact of the Great War in Cyprus, the 1931 
uprising in the volatile interwar period and the inflexibility of the colonial rule to 
address the local requests are discussed as a defining stage towards the polarization of 
the Cypriot society and the outburst of violence. Following World War II, the 
reshuffling of powers inside and around Cyprus is examined. 
Chapter five describes the preparation of the imminent conflict against the 
background of internal developments but also the regional environment during the Cold 
War and the British withdrawal from Eastern Mediterranean. The outline of EOKA’s 
fight against the colonial rule, the ensuing inter-communal clashes and the 
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus are presented as the culmination of a lasting 
process of alienation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and the pursue of 
different objectives. Chapter six contains the main conclusions for the role of the 
internal and the external factors that defined the relationship between the two 
communities during the eighty-two years of colonial rule in Cyprus. The appendix 
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includes maps, a table of demographic data and images of representative scenes, events, 
ordinary people and protagonists in Cypriot history during the reference period. 
The selection of bibliography was a challenge due to its plethora and, 
occasionally, its partiality. The intention has been the combination of older and more 
recent literature from various scholars and sources. 
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Introduction 
 
Alongside to the great Eastern civilizations, the Cypriots created a distinct 
Hellenic culture, marked through the ages by the strategic location and the mineral 
wealth of the island they lived in since the seventh millennium B.C. The position as a 
crossroads for the commerce of three continents and the lands rich with copper brought 
the Mycenaeans-Achaeans settlers from Peloponnese to Cyprus. The spread of the 
Mycenaean culture heralded the Hellenization of the island as a gradual and peaceful 
process, attested to be completed during the 12th century B.C. Scholar Vasos 
Karagiorghis points out the paramount importance of this evolution for the history of 
Cyprus, an island geographically1 but also in terms of economy, culture and- 
sometimes- politics turned towards the East.2 Among numerous conquerors, pirates and 
settlers, ancient Greeks and Persians, Byzantines and Arabs, Catholics and Orthodox 
Christians, Christians and Muslims, a cultural diversity was formulated and, through the 
ages, an element of dualism underlaid the history of Cyprus.  
In the sixteenth century, the inaction of the Venetian rulers, the disputes between 
the Christian Cypriot leaders and the apathy of the native population paved the way 
from the conquest of the island by the Ottomans. Although the Christian European 
powers defeated the Ottoman fleet at Lepanto, at the same time in Cyprus, following a 
siege to Nicosia and Famagusta, the Ottoman rule was established in 1571 for the next 
three centuries. The Greek Cypriots were rather positive to the transition from the 
Venetian autocracy to the new domination. There were cases that the Greek element 
actively supported the new rulers. The religious hatred between the Orthodox and the 
Latin clergy -once again in history- brought closer the Ottoman East instead of the 
Christian West.3 The nucleus of the island's Turkish community emanates from the 
Ottoman soldiers and the succeeding settlers from Southern Anatolia. The newcomers 
settled in agricultural lands confiscated from the Latins and lived scattered in most parts 
of the island. 
                                                          
1 Cyprus is located 97 kilometers west of Syria, 64 kilometers south of Turkey and 380 kilometers east of Rhodes 
island. 
2 Vasos Karagiorghis, ‘Cyprus in Antiquity’, in Tenekidis G., Kranidiotis G. (eds.) Kύπρος: Iστορία, Προβλήματα και 
Αγώνες του λαού της [ Cyprus: History, Problems and Struggles of her people] (2nd ed., Athens: Estia-Kollaru, 
2000), 17-21. 
3 Giorgos Georghis, ‘Από την πρώτη στη δεύτερη αγγλοκρατία: 1191-1878’ [From the first to the second British rule: 
1191-1878], in Tenekidis G., Kranidiotis G. (eds.) Kύπρος: Iστορία, Προβλήματα και Αγώνες του λαού της [ Cyprus: 
History, Problems and Struggles of her people] (2nd ed., Athens: Estia-Kollaru, 2000), 112-117; Eugene K. Keefe 
and Eric Solsten, ‘Historical Setting’ in Eric Solsten (ed.) Cyprus: A Country Study (fourth edition, USA: Library 
of Congress, 1993), 17-18. 
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By the end of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire, a shadow of its former 
self, ceded the island to Britain in 1878. When the British arrived, the harbours had 
declined and the economic activity was weakened because of the empire's commercial 
ineptitude. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, infestations of locusts, lack of water 
and famines also contributed to the general condition of decay. As the medieval social 
structure was fading away, the communities resurfaced in search of a new modus 
vivendi in a shifting environment. 
The British rule until 1960 in Cyprus is often described in literature as a typical 
example of the “divide and rule” policy which resulted, almost inescapably, into an 
intergroup conflict. In 1956, J. S. Furnivall described the effect of the British rule in the 
colony of Burma, the spread of nationalist ideology and the breakdown of traditional 
social institutions as follows: 
“At the beginning of the century it was a commonplace to describe the 
Burman as tolerant of foreigners, though indifference was a more 
accurate description of his attitude. At that time such racial or class 
feeling as may have existed was limited to Europeans, who found 
Indians less attractive than Burmans, had little sympathy with Indian 
Nationalism, and to some extent were already apprehensive of Indian 
competition. But twenty years later, Burmans were held to feel a 
'natural antipathy' to Indians.”4 
In the case of Cyprus, many scholars have challenged the accuracy of this 
perception as an over- simplified approach of a far more complicated case of 
nationalism(s) that marked the modern history of the island. 
In the late nineteenth century, doctrines of the West were introduced by the 
British rule into the traditional society of Cyprus. These doctrines were imposed over 
populations that were formulated into the multiethnic environment of the Ottoman 
Empire and therefore were alien to their practical experience of political representation. 
While most subjects of the empire in the Middle East considered themselves either 
Sunnis or Shiites or Druzes or Maronites or Greek Orthodox or ‘Latins’ or Jews, official 
British documents referred to the population in the colony of Cyprus as ‘Greek’ and 
‘Turk’. By 1931 and the ﬁrst violent demonstration on part of the Greek Cypriots 
                                                          
4 J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice (New York, 1956), 196. 
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against colonial authority a drastic shift from a (sole) religious identity to a national one 
paved the way to a conflict zone. The catalyst was the infestation of nationalist 
ideologies, as these were perceived by the traditional structures of the Cypriot 
communities, combined with the demands of peaceful coexistence under the colonial 
regime of artificial, imitative adoption of European constitutional practices and the 
British view of ‘pluralism’. Political manipulation, uprising and suppression ignited 
perpetual rivalries. As Elie Kedourie has stressed, “national self-determination is a 
principle of disorder, not of order.”5  
The pattern of establishing colonial rule by collaboration with a colony’s minority 
was not a British exclusivity.  To the east of Cyprus, in Lebanon, when the Maronites 
felt threaten by the prospect of an independent Arab state, the French regime offered 
them a safety net within the French ‘jewel in its new Middle Eastern empire.’6 Some 
years later, the formation of a greater Lebanon from Syria and the following 
incorporation of large Sunni and Shia Muslim minorities set in motion those powers that 
resulted in a civil war and the ultimate eclipse of - the loyal to the French - Maronite 
leadership. In short, David K. Fieldhouse contends that, “it is arguable that the worst 
thing the French did in Lebanon was not to postpone independence and continually 
interfere in Lebanese politics, but to create a plural society”.7 
On the former Ottoman island of Cyprus, a Greek-speaking Eastern Orthodox 
Christian majority of some 80 per cent and a Turkish-speaking Muslim minority of 
some 20 per cent had lived together under British administration since 1878.8 Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots had previously lived mixed,9 though, by the end of Ottoman rule, in 
towns there was an apparent concentration into quarters10 as reflection of social 
distinctions.  
                                                          
5 Elie Kedourie, ‘A New International Disorder’, in The Crossman Confessions and Other Essays in Politics, History 
and Religion (London 1984), 99. 
6 David K. Fieldhouse, Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914–1958 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
328. 
7 Ibid., 329. 
8 Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey A modern history (third revised edition, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 237. 
9 The 1832 Ottoman census recorded 172 mixed villages, see Niazi Kızılyürek, ‘The Turkish Cypriot Upper Class 
and Question of Identity’, in Kızılyürek N., Naldoven F., Yashin N., Yucel H. (eds.) Turkish Cypriot Identity in 
Literature (London, 1990), 21 cited after Andrekos Varnavas, ‘Cypriots Transforming their Identity during the 
Early British Period: From a Class, Religious and Regional Identity to a Hellenic Ethno-Nationalist Identity’, in 
Michalis N. Michael, Tassos Anastassiades and Chantal Verdeil (eds.) Religious Communities and Modern 
Statehood: The Ottoman and Post-Ottoman World at the Age of Nationalism and Colonialism (Berlin: Klaus 
Schwarz Verlag, 2015), 151. 
10 Rolandos Katsiaounis, Labour, society and politics in Cyprus during the second half of the nineteenth century, 
Cyprus research centre texts and studies of the history of Cyprus, XXIV (Nicosia, 1996), 49. 
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The relationship between Eastern Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Cyprus, 
has often been portrayed as a peaceful one.11 Especially in the rural areas, maybe due to 
common difficult living conditions for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, they appear to 
have formed a shared set of customs – neither Greek nor Turkish exclusively.12 
It is clear, though, that within a strictly hierarchical society, the majority of the 
Christians in the island- like elsewhere within the Empire – did not escape the fate of 
the non-Muslim peoples being slaves to the Sultan, subjugated and living within a 
despotic and oppressive medieval regime. The Muslim Cypriots did not enjoy uniformly 
the benefits that derived from their membership in the governing ümmet (the religious 
community that commanded the empire), but when compared to the Christians, for 
example a Muslim along with a Christian Cypriot before the law or in the case of tax 
per capita for the non-Muslim subjects only, they were at an advantageous position. 
Numerous reports from Christians subjected to abuses caused by Turkish Cypriots were 
found in the archives of the Bishops of the island.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Michael A. Attalides, ‘Οι σχέσεις των Ελληνοκυπρίων με τους Τουρκοκύπριους’ [The relations of the Greek 
Cypriots with the Turkish Cypriots] in Tenekidis G., Kranidiotis G. (eds.) Kύπρος: Iστορία, Προβλήματα και 
Αγώνες του λαού της [ Cyprus: History, Problems and Struggles of her people] (2nd ed., Athens: Estia-Kollaru, 
2000), 416 – 418. 
12 M. A. Ramady, ‘The role of Turkey in Greek-Turkish Cypriot Communal Relations’, in Coufoudakis V. (ed.) 
Essays on the Cyprus Conflict: In memory of Stephen G. Xydis (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1976), 4-5. 
13 Katsiaounis (1996), 55. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
The British rule: the first decades 
 
In 1878 the Ottomans handed over Britain the control of the island of Cyprus. The 
British annexation of Cyprus in November 1914 followed the outburst of the First 
World War and the island was transformed into a fully ﬂedged British crown colony 
after 1925. The idea behind this offer was the confrontation of the Russian menace and 
the consolidation of an alliance between the collapsing Empire and the colonial British 
Crown. Though the former retained the suzerainty over the island until the end of the 
first World War, there was a clear transfer of power, encompassing notions from the 
previous socio-economic regime. 
From the British standpoint, there were two main motives for the acquisition of 
Cyprus. The first one was related to strategy. Cyprus was not the first choice for Britain. 
The island lacked a decent port and malaria further repelled the presence of British 
soldiers. It offered though – ideally coupled with Alexandretta – an outpost for the 
British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and a base to safeguard the Euphrates 
river and the land route to India and its resources should the Suez Canal become 
inaccessible.14 Some years later, in 1882, when Egypt was put under the British control, 
any investment on Cypriot infrastructure was curtailed.15 
Secondly, Cyprus was envisaged to evolve into a role model of the British-led 
modernization of the Ottoman territory in Asia Minor. The ‘paciﬁc invasion of 
Englishmen into Turkey’ in the context of a wide Anglo-Ottoman reforming alliance 
could use as a spearhead the case of Cyprus. Such plans, though, were soon to be 
abandoned and the newly acquired colony was in search of a new role in serving the 
British interests. Cyprus was not important for the British crown until some decades 
later when new actors appeared on the regional scene and a new balance of powers 
emerged.16 
                                                          
14 Robert Holland and Diana Markides, The British and the Hellenes in Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern 
Mediterranean 1850–1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 164. 
15 Giorgos Tsalakos, ‘Σύντομη επισκόπηση ορισμένων όψεων της αγγλοκρατίας στην Κύπρο’ [Brief review of 
certain aspects of the British rule in Cyprus], in Tenekidis G., Kranidiotis G. (eds.) Kύπρος: Iστορία, Προβλήματα 
και Αγώνες του λαού της [ Cyprus: History, Problems and Struggles of her people] (2nd ed., Athens: Estia-Kollaru, 
2000), 143. 
16 Holland and Markides (2006), 165. 
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General Sir Garnet Wolseley was the first British High Commissioner in Cyprus, 
answerable to the Colonial Office. He had accepted his appointment rather grudgingly; 
he did not believe in the project of reforming the Ottomans and from the beginning he 
established a distance between the new administration and local society.17 Wolseley 
tried to superimpose on religiously defined institutions some modernized procedures 
and principles of administration, the intention being to render them ‘into something like 
British shape’.18 Very soon, though, he received instructions not to ‘dislocate the 
existing [Ottoman] machinery’.19 In any case, raising taxes, as the main preoccupation 
of the all kind of rulers, remained unchangeable during this period of change. 
The British political culture, based on the separation between State and Church 
was in striking contrast with the Ottoman tradition and the millet 20 system. The British 
and the belief in their own superiority and distinctiveness was politically and 
philosophically against the secular character of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus. It was 
only a matter of time the new regime to meet with great expectations, suspicion and, 
eventually, resistance from the local ecclesiastical elite. Common interests shaped ways 
of cohabiting but the profound differences undermined the development of a real, 
mutual understanding.  
The 1882 constitution  
On 30 November 1882 a new Constitution was promulgated in Cyprus. Under its 
provisions, a representative institution, namely the eighteen-member Legislative 
Council21 replaced the previous Ottoman Medjli Idare (The Central Administrative 
Council). Its members from local society were elected separately by the two 
communities (3 Muslims, 9 Christians). The rest six members were British ofﬁcials 
appointed by the High Commissioner.22 The allocation of elected places in the chamber 
was in accordance with the demographic composition of the island; it was a drastic 
alteration compared to the previous regime. It is also obvious that the British, when 
                                                          
17 Ibid., 165 – 166. 
18 F. Maurice and George Arthur, Life of Wolseley (London, 1924), 101, cited after Holland and Markides (2006), 
166. 
19 Ibid, 93. 
20 millet (A. milla), in modern Turkish "nation", in classical Arabic, a community of faith, in 19th century diplomacy, 
a non-Muslim community in the Ottoman Empire. 
21 This Legislative Council was also called, mockingly, a “toy parliament” since its member were not entitled to make 
any decision about the budget, see Heinz A. Richter, A Concise History of Modern Cyprus 1878-2009, Peleus, Bd. 
50 (Mainz:  Rutzen, 2010), 22. 
22 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, The Cyprus Question, 1878–1960: The Constitutional Aspect (Minneapolis: Minnesota 
Mediterranean and East European Monographs, 2002), 25–28, cited after Holland and Markides (2006), 168.  
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collaborating with the Turkish Cypriots representatives, could overturn any decision of 
the Greek elected members within this constitutional framework. In case of a numerical 
deadlock, the High Commissioner held the decisive vote. These constitutional 
provisions established the political segregation of Christians and Muslims and the 
subsequent formation of two, institutionally recognized, political entities in Cyprus.23 
The introduction of the system of free24 elections for the Legislative Council was, 
no doubt, a turning point in the governance of the island. However, it was not 
accompanied by an equivalent enrolment in public administration. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, Greek Cypriots, who represented almost 80 per cent of total 
population, occupied 50 per cent of the government posts under the British higher 
officials. The discrepancy was even higher in the recruitment of the police force.25 
At the same time, a very important transformation of the island’s legal and 
judicial system was accomplished, in line with British principles. A Supreme Court was 
established in Nicosia and the application of Ottoman Law by the District Courts was 
gradually but decisively fading away. Overnight, one of the most significant pillars of 
the social status was modernized. The British reforms, especially the ones regarding the 
legal institutions, targeted mainly those who had benefits from the previous regime, the 
Muslim officials:  
‘[I]t cannot be denied, and the fact should not be lost sight of, that the 
British occupation has very greatly injured one class, viz., that from 
which the former Government obtained the majority of its public 
employés,”[…..]“To the Moslem officials,” [British rule] “was soon 
shown to be a gradual, if not a sudden, ruin.’26  
 
 
                                                          
23 Sia Anagnostopoulou, ‘Η Εκκλησία της Κύπρου και ο Εθναρχικός της ρόλος: 1878-1960’ [The Church of Cyprus 
and its ethnarchic role: 1878-1960), Σύγχρονα Θέματα [Current Affairs], 68-70, (2002), 201. 
24 The use of the term ‘free’ is appropriate only compared to the previous system. In fact, the British had established, 
by law, certain financial criteria for the participation of the Cypriot voters that resulted in excluding a significant 
number of them. Furthermore, during the first years of elections, the voting was not secret and therefore many 
voters could not freely express their political preference. 
25 By the end of the century, the Greek Cypriots occupied 237 out of 472 in total. The Turkish Cypriots, though only 
20% of the population had 198 posts (42%). Preference for minority communities was more pronounced in the case 
of the Armenians and Maronites who, comprising 2% of the population, were allocated 37 posts (8%). As late as 
1919, out of 763 men in the police force, 420 (55%) were Turkish Cypriots, see Katsiaounis (1996), 81. 
26 Report by Colonel Warren enclosed in Biddulph to Colonel Stanley, 18th December 1885. CO 883/4, 25, cited 
after Altay Nevzat ‘Nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus: the first wave’ (doctoral dissertation, University of 
Oulu, 2005), 106. 
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The Turkish Cypriots. The first reactions 
The Muslim Cypriots protested every one of these reforms. Meanwhile, both the 
elite and the mass of Muslim community collaborated with the British rulers against 
Christian community who outnumbered them by four to one,27 formally within the 
Legislative Council in most cases, but also outside of it.  
The first Turkish newspaper, Saded, was published eleven years after the Greek 
Cypriots edited their first newspaper in August 1878. This delay is an indication of a 
community with a different political attitude, lacking political culture. Indeed, the 
Turkish Cypriots found themselves unprepared, bereft of their traditional institutions 
following the collapse of the medieval social structure. The transition was a challenge 
for both communities. But furthermore, religion and state, in Islam, stood the one inside 
the other.28 Secular view of society was a concept in contradiction with the fundamental 
principle of order in the medieval Empire under the Ottomans. The lack of a Muslim 
middle class29 further contributed to the backwardness of their intellectual and political 
activity30 compared to Greek Cypriots – at least until some decades later and the 
introduction of nationalist ideologies within the Turkish Cypriot community under the 
influence of the marching Young Turks in Asia Minor. 
In 1933 Zeka Bey describes in the Söz newspaper the reaction of the Turkish 
Cypriots in the post-Ottoman period in the following words: 
“After Turkey has departed from this island, the remaining Turks are 
like orphans who have been deprived of motherly love. For quite some 
time they have found themselves in a state of bewilderment as to what 
they should do and were even very late in coming to the realization 
that they were orphans. The Turks, accustomed to living on the island 
as members of the dominant community, were not easily capable of 
comprehending their changed circumstances on the island and the 
need to change their attitude. On the other hand, the other group, 
which they had for centuries learnt to live with as a community under 
Turkish administration, was in a superior position to us. When faced 
                                                          
27 Katsiaounis (1996), 66. 
28 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (2nd ed., London: Hurst & Company, 1998), 8. 
29 Katsiaounis (1996), 67. 
30 Charles Beckingham has described the Turks during the first 30 years of British rule as intellectually inactive and 
politically apathetic, see ibid., 67. 
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by such an organized, competitive group that was in the majority, and 
lacking a government on whose unconditional support we could rely, 
as the days passed we began to lose our position.”31  
The absence of the old safeguard, the “Ottoman hand” for the support of the 
Turkish Cypriots coupled with the economic advancement of the Greek Cypriots and 
the latter’s expressed desire for unification with Greece, formulated an uneasy 
environment for the relationship of the two communities under the British government. 
The boundaries between the elites and the peasants - irrespective of their religion – 
remained very strict. The social boundaries between Christians and Muslims were 
permittable. There was a clear segregation of the two communities, yet it was not highly 
politized until some decades later. There was, though, a growing tension and suspicion 
that underlaid their common living. Rolandos Katsiaounis mentions a deputation of 
Turkish Cypriots, led by the Mufti Ali Refki Effendi who had filed a formal complaint 
“that the Christians had adopted a menacing attitude and that ill-feeling had spread to 
women and boys [and according to the deputation], the disturbance was being caused by 
Greeks in the market place and in public houses and brothels which stayed open during 
the night.”32 
Language and education  
Most of the Turkish Cypriots were bilingual; along with the Turkish Cypriot they 
also spoke the Greek Cypriot dialect.33 In 1881, 5,4 per cent of Turkish Cypriots had 
stated Greek as their mother tongue.34 The same did not apply in the Greek Cypriot 
community, where only a small percentage of its members would use the dialect of their 
Muslim neighbours. The elites of both communities and the emerging middle class used 
English as the lingua franca.35 
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The ‘Rushdie’ schools had opened in Cyprus shortly before the official British 
arrival, providing post elementary education from 1862 onwards. By the 1890’s twenty-
one such schools had been established throughout the island, its curriculum based 
largely on the modern secondary education guidelines. Most of schools, though, 
particularly elementary ones, remained nominally under the communal control and the 
religious institutions. The Greek Cypriots, as Michael Attalides stresses, attended their 
own schools in a more autonomous way compared to the Turkish ones.36 The Greek 
Cypriots funded their own schools37 for the modernization of the education. The 
structure of the Ottoman traditional schools, placing emphasis in their curricula on law 
and theology was a factor that caused the higher degree of control by the British– only 
until the events of 1931 and the sanctions imposed on all sectors of administration 
following the uprising of the Greek Cypriots. 
The foundations of separated educational institutions laid back to the Ottoman 
period when Christian and Muslim students attended different schools. As a result, 
social mobilization could not develop among ethnic groups. All schools followed a 
largely religious curriculum directed by the priest and the hoca respectively. Panayiotis 
Persianis argues that the British were not willing to invest in education reforms in 
Cyprus.38 The new rulers of the island respected the right of the communities to select 
the schools of their choice. This ‘adapted education’ policy was practised at other 
colonies as well and was promoted as a manifestation of liberal principles. But in fact, 
the policy of establishing and running multiracial schools controlled by the central 
authority demands significant financial resources the colonial regime - through its 
‘liberal’ approach, conveniently - avoided to provide. 
The ‘Megali Idea’ and the infiltration into Cyprus   
Α school of ‘modern learning’, modeled on the Philological Gymnasium of 
Smyrna, was reported to be in operation in Cyprus already in 1819.39 Through a 
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network of educational institutions, the Greek irredentist ideology, on the grounds of 
unity and continuity of Hellenism inside and outside the Greek state, nurtured the 
aspirations of all Hellenes living under difficult conditions. The ‘Great Idea’ dominated 
Greek domestic politics and foreign policy until 1922. As Paschalis Kitromilides has 
pointed out, the conception of this idea “for the unredeemed Greeks of the Ottoman 
Empire was a concrete aspiration for political order and material progress under the 
aegis of a national entity with which they could identify symbolically and culturally.”40  
A channel of communication between Greece and Cyprus was institutionalised 
through the presence of the Greek embassy in Nicosia from 1846 onwards. The young 
Greek Cypriot elites, following their studies at the university in Greece would become 
socially prestigious upon their return to the island. Additionally, through commercial 
networks with other centres of Hellenic Diaspora like Smyrna, Constantinople and 
Alexandria, the dominant ideology of the National centre penetrated Cyprus. The 
adoption of nationalist ideas, on the other hand, was aided by the implementation of 
reforms by the Ottomans in 1830, 1839 and 1856. 41 
At the beginning, the Greek Cypriots had viewed the British rule as a mere 
transitional stage on the way to unification with motherland Greece, encouraged to this 
aspiration by the recent history of the Ionian Islands.42 Soon they realized that on the 
most vital issues, as representatives of the majority of the total population of the island, 
they were politically powerless, in other words not very far from how they had lived 
under the Ottomans.43 
On March 8, 1895 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir W. Harcourt, delivered a 
speech indicating that, if Britain was to evacuate Cyprus, it would revert back to 
Turkey.44  Shortly afterwards, the Greek Cypriots strongly opposed to this statement 
and held rallies all over the island. The Commissioner of Nicosia, Merton King 
reported:  
                                                                                                                                                                          
Great Idea’, in David Ricks and Paul Magdalino (eds.) Byzantium and the Modern Greek Identity (London, King's 
College: Ashgate 1998). 
40 Kitromilides (2013), 332. 
41 Tsalakos (2000), 152. 
42 Katsiaounis (1996), 66. 
43 Holland and Markides (2006), 168. 
44 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. XXX I (Fourth Series), March 8, 1895, columns 686-698, cited after Katsiaounis 
(1996), 209.   
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“The numbers that attended the meeting did not, I think, exceed 
two thousands of which fully one half were residents of the town of 
Nicosia, and of these again, a very large proportion were lads of 18-20 
years of age, or even younger, and it was chiefly by these last named 
members of the audience that the cheers were raised, and applause 
given to the telling points in the speakers' addresses, as also the most 
vociferous shouts condemning the taxes and the Tribute. The numbers 
that assembled at Government House were greater, I think, by three or 
four hundred, than those at the meeting...At this assembly too, no 
spectator could, I think, fail to be struck by the tender age of a very 
large number of those of which it was composed.”45 
Individualism and the notion of citizenship were alien to the Ottoman subjects. 
Political power had been completely detached from all social strata.46 Apart from the 
elites of each community and their representative political role, most of the people in 
Cyprus were living, for centuries, confined to their households and dealing with family 
affairs.47 But the air of modernization in the administration of the island by the British 
had brought hopes in the minds and the hearts of Greek Cypriots, who had been hoping 
for enosis with Greece from the onset of the new regime. Even though the reality did 
not meet these expectations, the shift from a despotic regime to a more liberal one, 
established by the British rulers, gave a new impetus and a new direction to the young 
Cypriots and their potential for participating in the conduct of public affairs.  
It may not be far from truth to say that education in the Christian schools was a 
vehicle for the propagation of nationalist agendas. During the nineteenth century and 
before the British rule, only few Cypriots were literate. Access to education was not a 
privilege for everyone, and was related almost exclusively to religious context. During 
the last decades of the century and for varying time periods, many young Christian 
school boys in Cyprus had received the basics of Hellenic education. Katsiaounis 
further elaborated the issue of young Greek Cypriots from lower social classes by 
stressing the importance of “their first contact with social reality during their conscious 
life and their experience of the misery and deprivation which characterized the late 
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1880s and the years after.”48 Panayiotis Persianis who studied the educational system in 
Cyprus from 1878 until 1960 contends that already from the decades following 1821, 
Greek teachers in the schools of Cyprus were teaching under the direct influence of the 
‘Megali Idea’.49  
By the end of the nineteenth century the historical narrative of Greek Cypriots 
marked a significant change in its perspective. Tefkros, as founder of the Cypriot city of 
Salamis, emerged as the mythical ancestor of Cypriot people, in line with the new 
theoretical edifice of ‘Greekness’ and the appeal to the glorious ancient past of 
Hellenes. Only one century before, Archimandrites Kyprianos had published his 
Chronological History of the island of Cyprus according to which the people of the 
island traced origins from the biblical world and Hettim, the grandson of Noah. As 
Paschalis Kitromilides argues, this shift on the eve of the twentieth century was only 
part of a regional transformation of identities in Eastern Mediterranean and the 
emergence of national consciousness in the former Ottoman lands.50  This historical 
manipulation, under the supervision of the Church of Cyprus, set the background for the 
proliferation of nationalist ideologies, through public education and the discipline of 
History that facilitated “the reproduction of myths and their acceptance as historical 
facts.”51 
There are not many British sources about the education of the Turkish Cypriots 
during the last decades of the nineteenth century; there is no evidence that they nurtured 
the ideas of Turkish nationalism among the Muslims in the island through educational 
institutions. There were, though, public expressions by members of the community over 
the need for reforms in the curricula of their schools ‘as patriotic duty’. The request 
included a less religious context, more oriented towards modern sciences - along with 
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reading and writing - and harmonized with the process of modernization already applied 
at the time – to some degree - in the Christian schools.52 
Economy  
The reforms of the British administration had drastically curtailed widespread 
corruption, paving the way to the improvement of the economy.53 In the context of a 
largely peasantry economy, trading activities were intensified,54 the circulation of 
newspapers was increasing and prosperity seemed to be more feasible for Cypriots - but 
not for all of them.  The distribution of this growth was not equal between the two 
communities. Even though they shared a common past during the Ottoman period and 
there was interaction between Christians and Muslims, the cultural differences played a 
decisive role in their economic evolution.55 The Greek Cypriots were clearly performing 
better in economic terms. The traditional Ottoman structure was an impediment to the 
evolution of bourgeois among Muslims and to the accumulation of wealth within the 
more liberal economic environment the British promoted in Cyprus. The reaction of the 
Turkish Cypriots was rather confined to the preservation of as many privileges as 
possible under the new British leadership.56  
The emerging middle class, centred mainly in Limassol and Larnaca, gradually 
formed a new political power in opposition to the traditional hegemony of the Cypriot 
Orthodox Church and the conservative establishment around the Archbishopric in 
Nicosia.57 During the 1890s nationalist ideas were spreading but this evolution was not 
in contradiction with keeping close relations between elite circles and British officials, 
since the latter were the most important customers for the former. The middle class in 
Cyprus included, among others, many lawyers with ambitions for a career in politics, 
educated in Athens and affected by the Hellenic nationalist movement; the High 
Commissioner reported in 1900: 
“The village communities are composed of a fine peasantry who are at 
present contented and industrious. The town communities, however, 
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contain many political agitators, including several Greek advocates, 
who have little business and who have much to gain from agitation.”58 
The cultivation of nationalist sentiment, apparently, offered an opportunity for 
social and economic advancement, a new pole of mass consensus outside of religion, 
especially to those who were previously excluded from power. The senior clergy and 
the tax collectors were now interested in securing the privileges they were granted by 
the Ottomans and, thus, were more careful with the new rulers. The lower classes, 
though, did not have much to put in risk and, for that reason, along with the ‘patriotic 
duty’, there was a desire to legitimize their own political and economic status.59 The 
shift of rule from the Ottomans to the British had triggered the struggle for power 
between the two leading communities in Cyprus. It was of great importance the fact that 
antagonism between members of the same community was also sparked. This 
competition played a decisively role in shaping the aspirations and in adopting – at 
different times - nationalist rhetoric by both communities. 
The ‘Tribute’ and the first agitations 
The annual tribute was a focal issue among both communities – even though for 
different reasons. This tribute was payable under the Cyprus Convention to the Sultan 
and thereafter was fixed at £92,000. This sum was a great burden for the weak and 
mostly agrarian population of the island along with the taxes imposed by the British 
administration. In 1889 taxation per head of population in Cyprus was 16s., compared 
to 14s.3d. in Samos, and 8s. in Crete.  The Turkish Cypriots, though, viewed this 
payment as a connection with the Porte and their wishful thoughts of returning to the 
Ottoman Empire. Exactly for this connotation, the Greek Cypriots resented even more 
the outflow of funds in the name of the Ottoman rule that no longer existed in practice. 
On top of this, both communities soon realised that this tribute was not received by the 
Ottoman treasury but by the British and French bondholders as compensation for the 
non - serviced 1855 Crimean War Loan by the Sultan.   
Indicative of a growing anti – government sentiment and its use by different 
groups was the case of the deputation to the Colonial Office in London and the 
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accompanying memorandum addressed to the queen of England.60 Following the 
economic crisis of 1887, a widespread discontent erupted initially among the peasants 
which was expressed in the traditional form of petitions to the government. Very soon, 
though, the misery of the peasantry met the poverty of the labourers and the nationalist 
ideas promoted by the (ambitious) bourgeois living in the major cities. The taxes were 
not collected and the state revenue was sharp falling. The agitation was accelerated, 
imbedded with clear political underpinnings. Delegates from all over the island decided 
to proceed to the deputation. At the beginning, the Turkish Cypriots supported the 
movement but later they decided to abstain because they disagreed on the demand for 
the abolition of the annual tribute, which even though a burden, it still signified the link 
to the Ottomans. Another rupture occurred over the leadership and the rivalry between 
the two poles of political expression within the Greek Cypriot community. In the words 
of the High Commissioner, the deputation was the decision of the majority “though not 
without a strong opposition by the more moderately inclined persons”.61 In other words, 
probably for the first time, the ecclesiastic elite was dragged into a decision, aiming to 
confirm its leading role. The delegation of 1889 requesting that the level of taxation be 
lowered, the tribute be cut by half and assistance be granted to the agricultural sector of 
the economy was fruitless, but it revealed in public life the new social divisions in 
Cyprus. 
In any case, the distance between elites, on one hand, and the rest of the people, 
on the other, remained clear. Class and religion were still the main determinants of 
identity.  The relationship of those competing elites over power, their degree of 
collaboration with the British rulers, the inner-communal rivalries and, most 
importantly, the adoption and use of current nationalist ideologies coupled with the 
economic inequality significantly curtailed the possibilities of creating a common 
Cypriot identity. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
The rise of Greek Cypriot nationalism 
 
In 1896, seventy-five young Greek Cypriots were recruited for the patriotic cause 
of the Cretans against the Ottoman rule. They embarked in Crete following the local 
revolt, while the Cypriot Archbishop, as head of a committee, expressed solidarity by 
offering humanitarian aid to refugees.62 But the crises in the Near East from the mid-
1880s onwards63 and the growing tension in the Balkans between the Greeks and the 
Ottoman Turks which resulted in the Greek-Turkish War in 1897 set limitations for 
pursuing national causes in Cyprus. The outcome of this unfortunate - for the Greeks - 
war, supported by 1,000 Greek Cypriot volunteers64 rendered the Christians in Cyprus 
more skeptical about their action plans. They considered they had to wait for more 
adequate circumstances for the realization of their objective while they continued to 
foster the ideal of enosis mainly through the education of the next generation. In the 
aftermath of the war, both Christian and Muslim elites continued to collaborate with the 
British and the gap between the two communities was growing deeper. Publicly, 
political activity diverged into other matters of wide interest.65 
The Church of Cyprus 
The principles of the British administration posed a serious challenge for the 
religious institutions of both communities. The roles assigned by the previous regime 
was in need to be reaffirmed in a social reality that was undergoing structural changes. 
The Orthodox Church in Cyprus had experienced different degrees of collaboration with 
the Sultan during the three centuries of the Ottoman rule. In general, the segregation of 
the non-Muslim groups had cultivated the elements of cohesion amongst the members 
of each group and had facilitated the protection from influences that might upset the 
established order. These groups were recognized by the ruler who granted them, by his 
favour, administrative and juridical rights and duties.66 Within this context, the 
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Archbishop of Cyprus, as head of the Christian Orthodox Church in the island,67 was 
recognized as a kind of delegate of the Sultan within his community. The reforms 
applied during the Tanzimat period in the nineteenth century vested this role with an 
institutional form as part of the millet system. The Eastern Orthodox Christian Church 
was part of hierarchical system based on deference and obedience. Absolute loyalty to 
the supreme ruler was a prerequisite for the community to keep its traditions and its 
cultural distinctiveness.  The ecclesiastical leader was not appointed by the ruler; the 
legitimacy for the approval of his role by the Sultan derived from the fact that he was 
the person who expressed the will of the community.68 Against this background, the 
context of the term ‘ethnarch’ should be viewed and analysed. The diffusion of the 
‘Megali Idea’ and the ideology of irredentism rendered the ‘millet’ into ‘Genos’ but 
since there was a national-political center now established in Greece, the ‘millet basi’ - 
the Archbishops just like the Ecumenical Patriarch - was in threat of his authority being 
curtailed. Eventually, the Archbishop of the Cypriot Orthodox Church was identified as 
the leader of ‘Genos’ in Cyprus. 
Rolandos Katsiaounis contends that “Christian belief and practice provided the 
framework within which people were expected to live”.69 The power of the Orthodox 
Church was far beyond the political representation of the enslaved Greek Cypriots under 
the Ottomans and their national desires under the British. The Church was the trustee of 
the Byzantine traditions, of the legacy of the empire that had lasted over one thousand 
years and was the link that connected modern Greeks with their ancestors in antiquity.  
Byzantium could not be viewed disconnected from Christianity. The Christian Cypriots, 
for many centuries, could not perceive their cultural and spiritual identity outside of the 
influence of the Church. By the mid nineteenth century, education and intellectual 
activity in the island – with only few exceptions in Larnaca and Limassol- were largely 
intermingled with religious context; only two bookshops existed in the capital and both 
were selling books of religious content, by rule imported from Smyrna.70 
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The British rule can be described as a disaster for the hegemony of the Cypriot 
Orthodox Church within the Greek Cypriot community, in terms of finances and 
political leverage. The British administrators, upon their arrival, may have perceived the 
Christian millet as a (distant) part of Europe, mainly due to the religious relatedness, 
partly due to a common reference to the Hellenic-Roman culture.71 But, in any case, the 
privileges of the Cypriot Church belonged to the past. The British administrators kept a 
very firm stance on this matter. The -profitable– duty for tax collection, the exemption 
from property taxes for ecclesiastical lands, the immunity of the clergy for cases of 
common law were all abolished by the British.72 The Church's income shrunken by 
more than two thirds,73 whilst old title deeds of the Church and of several Prelates over 
enormous territories to pasture and forest land were disregarded and eventually lost to 
them by the new administration.74 
In December 1878 Captain A. G. Wauchope, Commissioner of Paphos, reported 
on the imposition of vergi (property) tax upon the district's monasteries:  
“The Bishop here tries to make out that by some fermans of ancient 
date they are exempt. But of fermans I am ignorant and at present am 
trying to collect from the convents as per margin.”75 
The establishment of the Legislative Council in 1882 had signified the 
institutional abolition of the political role of the Church.76 New political powers 
appeared, eager to assume the – continuously undermined by the British-  leadership of 
the Greek Cypriot community, traditionally identified with the ecclesiastical elite. But 
the emerging social group lacked the experience and the ideological framework to 
confront directly the hegemony of the Church and the “by God given” authority. The 
split of the Greek Cypriot elite into two factions was inevitably transferred within the 
religious establishment. The first group, led by Archbishop Sophronios, opted co-
operation which the British and good relations with the Muslim elites - in other words, a 
favourable re-arrangement of the Ottoman hierarchical social system in a modernized 
context. The members of this group included the conservative or traditional rich elite, 
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the Prelates, merchants, land owners, farm-tax collectors, money-lenders. The other 
fraction, under the Bishop of Kitium, adopted an active nationalist agenda advocating 
enosis with motherland supported by members of the middle class in Limassol and 
Larnaca, freemasons, manufacturers, merchants and lawyers -many of the latter 
educated in Athens. It should be stressed that none of the members of both factions had 
raised an aggressive anti-colonial rhetoric; most of them were doing business with the 
British and promoted the networking with the rulers for their private interests.  
In the 1901 elections for the new Legislative Council, the nationalists (the 
Kitiakoi) won all nine seats allocated to Greek Cypriots. The British officials 
understood at the time that the slogan for enosis with Greece had assumed a dynamic 
force:  
“And although it is true that the Greek Cypriots would prefer British 
rule to that of any other power, they now leave no opportunity of 
raising the cry for Union. But the mode of expression is very different 
to what it was a few years ago.”77 
The old establishment, though, was not willing to cede power. This growing 
competition became more apparent during the elections for the new Archbishop, 
following the death of Sophronios in 1900.78 Political tension was accelerated by the 
attraction of the impoverished segments of Christian Cypriot peasants and workers. 
They were vulnerable to clientelism and intimidation exerted upon them by both 
factions within a ferocious conflict that deeply divided the Cypriot society.79  The 
involvement of the lower social strata –still under the tight control of the elites - and of 
many young Greek Cypriots – who had never encountered the Ottoman rule- paved the 
way to imminent demands for more active participation in the political scene and the 
patriotic cause.  
The nationalist Archbishop of Kitiun, elected by the majority of the Greek Cypriot 
voters, was eventually enthroned only after a decade.  The division over an 
ecclesiastical question revealed an important development in the socio-political reality 
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in Cyprus. It relates to the evolution of the enosis ideology which resulted in the 
prevalence of a nationally minded Church. The dogma of enosis and the ethnarchic 
aspect of the Cypriot Church will develop, thereafter, in reciprocal relationship.  This 
change marked the pause of the curtailment of the Church’s power in the internal 
political scene. The infiltration of nationalism in the Christian Orthodox establishment 
provided an aspect of ‘sacred’ to the ideological content of the struggle for enosis. 
Simultaneously, the Church assumed a ‘national’ character which reflected the popular 
sentiment of Greek Cypriots but was not deeply connected with the longstanding 
tradition of the Christian Orthodox Church of Cyprus. 
The quest for ‘Enosis’  
‘Crete is not a pleasant neighbour for Cyprus,’ Haynes-Smith complained to 
Chamberlain in London.80 The Cretan revolution had a dual impact on internal politics 
in Cyprus. Firstly, it offered a model for Greek Cypriots; autonomy under a Greek 
prince in Crete was an appealing arrangement for those dreaming of unification with 
Greece. Among the Turkish Cypriots and their own dream of reuniting with the 
Ottoman Empire, the opposite sentiment was spreading. Secondly, the British felt the 
threat coming from the notion – supported now by the example of the Cretans -  that a 
change of the regime could be the outcome of a violent uprising against alien rulers. 
Such discussions were already beginning to be advocated in Cyprus within the most 
radical circles.81 
Τhe idea of enosis with motherland Greece was a catalyst in the development of 
the relationship between the two communities in Cyprus. Under the influence of the 
“Megali Idea”, the Greek Cypriot nationalists by the end of the nineteenth century had 
already established a narrative of continuity of Hellenism, implanted and spread through 
education whilst enosis had become the main discourse. From the onset of the British 
rule and the disintegration of the medieval hierarchy, the emerging middle class 
advocated a nationalist ideology expressed by enosis that also signified a desire for 
modernization.82 In this context and within the wider geopolitical framework, 
nationalists - despite their criticism of British colonialism - viewed Britain as a great 
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power that eventually would offer Cyprus to Greece, so as the latter would become a 
client state in the region under the hegemonic British sphere of influence. 
There was also a strategic dimension to enosis and its rhetoric. The distinction 
between uncompromising nationalists (adiallakti) and ‘compromisers’, traditionalists 
(diallaktiki) was shifted during the following decades. The idea of autonomy or 
independence appeared as an alternative option, instead of enosis, in line with the 
evolution of political struggles and the rhetorical tactics of all political groups. For 
example, when the communists appeared in the political scene of Cyprus during the 
1920s, they advocated independence. This attitude was in accordance with the 
theoretical edifice of communism encompassing all lower classes - irrespective of 
religious or ethnic barriers and opposed to the ideology of enosis expressed by the 
Orthodox Church and the bourgeois politicians. In the 1940s, the same political group, 
under the influence of the political events in Greece, made a drastic shift in their 
objective by demanding ‘enosis here and now’.83 In the 1950s, the adoption of the 
‘enosis and only enosis’ slogan was used by the Right’s politicians against the 
communists as a measure of “Greekness” – in reality, as another aspect of the rivalry 
between them.  
For the majority of the inhabitants in the island the Greek Cypriot identity 
gradually meant the – more or less fervent – support of the enosis ideology within a 
secularized context, patronized by the Archbishopric. The expectation for unification 
with Greece in the view of the Greek victories in the Balkan Wars further diminished 
the chances of any sincere dialogue with the Turkish Cypriots. The latter found 
themselves confined in two options. The first one was the acceptance of minority status 
– in case of unification with Greece - within a state comprised by Christian ex-Ottoman 
subjects. The second option was the modernisation through their own self-
determination, attached to the powerful British rulers for protection and approaching the 
Young Turks for the nationalist narration.  
The entrance of Greece in World War I and the impact on Cyprus 
Following the Balkan Wars, Greece had succeeded in territorial expansion to the 
north. Macedonia and the vulnerable Balkan frontiers remained the focus of integration 
and military preparations in the years to come. Under the leadership of Eleuftherios 
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Venizelos, Cyprus was never elevated to a high territorial priority issue. The division 
within the Greek society between the adherents of Venizelos, on one part, and of King 
Constantine, on the other, known as dixasmos had a profound effect in Greek politics. 
Its impact had reached the Greek Cypriots as well– paradoxically the British 
administrators allegedly favored the Germanophile king against Venizelos whose 
political inclination towards Britain has always been clear.84 But the most memorable 
diplomatic event regarding the Cypriot history during this period was the offer of the 
island, in 1915, to Greece as an inducement for the entry into the World War I on the 
side of the Allies. The urgency of the proposal was dictated by the strategic need to 
secure the Balkan front and the provision of military aid to Serbia against the Bulgarian 
threat. 
The Greek king and his Prime Minister, Alexander Zaimis, opted for neutrality 
and refused the offer.85 Thus, what appears to be the greatest opportunity, so far, for 
Cyprus and the peaceful settlement of regime was lost. “Perplexed and passive” was 
how Lord Clauson described response of the Greek Cypriots when the news arrived in 
the island through the Athenian newspapers.86 The Christians in Cyprus accepted the 
low ranking of their demand for enosis in the Greek agenda and they hoped for a 
favourable resolution - even directly - between Athens and London after the end of the 
war. When these expectations remained unfulfilled during the succeeding peace-making 
talks, Venizelos told the Greek Cypriots that ‘they should not appear [...] intransigent to 
the advice of the National Centre.’87 Greece was in no position to put in risk the gains of 
the previous ten years war and depended upon Britain in terms of security and economy. 
A confrontation with London over Cyprus was not a feasible political option for 
Venizelos. But the offer had created the idea of legitimacy for ceding Cyprus over 
Greece should the British decide to leave the island. In other words, the declined offer 
was viewed by the Greek Cypriots as an acknowledgement on part of Britain that, on 
national grounds, the Greek Cypriots were not unjustifiable to claim for unification with 
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Greece.88 Yet, this perception was more of a consolation to the Greek Cypriots and less 
of a political reality. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
The rise of Turkish Cypriot nationalism 
 
The Turkish Cypriot nationalist ideology had remained almost dormant during the 
first decades of the British rule. On the eve of the new century, rupture amongst Turkish 
Cypriots, suggestively, had erupted between the factions of the chief cadi (religious 
judge) and the Mufti (the chief interpreter of religious law, responsible for issuing 
religious decrees or fatwas).89 But nationalist ideas and the subsequent distinction 
between ‘modernists’ and ‘traditionalists’ within the Muslim community were only 
activated when the ‘motherland’ country abolished the sultanate, soon afterwards the 
caliphate and eventually a republican form of government was established, based upon 
the sovereignty of the people constituting one nation, the Turkish nation.  
From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism 
During the Hamidian era - unlike the Arabs and the Albanians in the Ottoman 
empire - the Turks, especially the common people, identified themselves only as 
Muslims.90 The sense of nationality and the differentiation of the Turks from the other 
Ottoman Muslims was at first expressed in the literary and educational fields.91 The 
origins of Turkish (or Turkist) nationalism emerged initially as a cultural movement in 
the nineteenth century and it was related to the work of European Orientalists and their 
interest in studying the origins of the Turks in Central Asia. Equally influential were the 
bourgeois Turks from the Russian Empire, notably the Tatars and the Azeris (also 
known as ‘Tatars’ at the time).92 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman empire was forced to cede 
more than 60 percent of its territory.93 Until the Balkan Wars in 1913 the collapsing 
imperial regime had signed agreements over population exchanges with Greece, 
Bulgaria and Serbia. Violent acts, slaughters and expulsions were not excluded by any 
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side. The aim to homogenize the newly established states within territories that have 
been for centuries the homeland of various populations became a constant source of 
tension and inter-ethnic rivalries. After the Balkan Wars, more than 80 percent of the 
European lands (and nearly 70 percent of its European population) were lost to the 
Ottoman Empire.94 A prominent Tatar political thinker of (Pan)Turkism, Yusuf 
Akçura95  declared,  
“We have been defeated. The Bulgar, the Serb, the Greek - our 
subjects of five centuries, whom we have despised, have defeated us. 
This reality, which we could not conjure up even in our imaginations, 
will open our eyes, will serve as a terrific slap in our faces to turn our 
heads in sane directions - if we are not yet entirely dead.”96 
Following the disastrous defeat, a huge wave of Balkan Muslim refugees headed 
toward southeast Anatolia, the home of a large Christian population.97 The ruling party, 
the Committee of Union and Progress (hereafter CUP)98 marked this historical event not 
with a "religious outcry, but as a spur to national regeneration".99 All modern societies 
at the time were ruled and motivated by national ideals, while the religious ideals were 
weakening. If the remaining Ottoman territory was to avoid further partition by the 
Western powers, the leaders of the CUP envisaged a transformation of their state by 
adopting– selectively – notions of the Western civilization.100 
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The cultivation of Turkish culture became the substratum of this new vision. The 
Unionists101 was an elitist class, detached from the people. They did not rely on the 
support of any solid religious, ethnic or social group within their country. The 
emergence of the CUP was not the outcome of a massive uprising. Another aggravating 
factor for the realization of the new vision was the reality of modernity within the 
Ottoman empire during its last period. The modernization in economic and social terms, 
was accomplished by the non – Muslim populations. But Christians were not included 
as components or even partners in the planning of the new state: 
“Just as the Jews and Germans constituted the bourgeoisie in Poland, 
in Turkey it was the native Jews, Greeks, and Armenians who were 
the agents and middlemen of European capitalism, and the Levantines 
whose nationality and citizenship are known to no one. If the Turks 
fail to produce among themselves a bourgeois class by profiting from 
European capitalism, the chances of survival of a Turkish society 
composed only of peasants and officials will be very slim.”102 
The word millet means “nation” in Turkish. But, traditionally, nation was 
perceived by the Ottomans as a community based on a religious affiliation, in no way 
related to any notions of nationality - language was not a safe marker of identity. 
Following the disintegration of the Ottoman millet system and between the absence of a 
solid national identity and of a (Muslim) middle class for the economic revival of the 
new country, Islam and its role in the new reality posed the most fundamental issue. The 
Islamists could not provide a convincing proposal for the regeneration of the country.103 
Since in Islam state and religion could not be conceived as individual concepts, the 
question of secularization of religion was raised by the Unionists. Gradually, what was 
planned to be modernized – for example law and education -  ceased to be religious, 
while “religious increasingly comprised anything that was not changing or should not 
change.”104 Against the so-called Islamic ideologies, “the Turks would be merely 
citizens in their relationship with the state” and Islam would survive as part of the 
national culture.105  Religion, however, never ceased to be fused in the life of most 
Turks. State and society remained and evolved in the following decades as individual 
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(not always separated) entities. Islamists did not disappear from the political scene 
either; during the 1950’s the conservative ruling Democrat Party resurfaced Islamic 
notions in public life when the need to attract new voters appeared. 
The ‘awakening’ of the Balkan nations and the creation of the Balkan states were 
triggering factors for the Turkish nationalism. But it was the emergence of national 
movements among the non-Muslims in territories that could not be ceded from the 
Empire that enflamed nationalist sentiments among a larger number of Turks.106 The 
Turkish national culture was formulated to include Muslims and Turks. The 
ethnoreligious homogenisation of Anatolia, a demographic policy as defined by Taner 
Akçam, was set in motion.107 Furthermore, the appearance of the Arab and, to a lesser 
extent, Albanian, and Kurdish political movements demanding autonomy or political 
separation108 became the decisive factor for the secularization of the Turkish nationalist 
movement. The Unionist leaders planned the reduction of the Christian population by 
expulsion or massacre as a prerequisite for the control of the remaining territories. Non-
Turkish Muslims, such as Kurds, Arabs, and Balkan migrants (including refugees from 
Christian persecution) were relocated and dispersed amongst the Turkish majority to be 
assimilated into the dominant culture.109 The ideal of Muslim Turks as the sole 
inhabitants of Anatolia was projected as a matter of national security.  
The reform program of CUP for the secularization of the state was planned to be 
accomplished via Turkification. The Western civilisation would provide the cultural 
elements “only as models for the cultivation of a modern national culture”.110 Besides 
the civil aspect of nationalism, the Unionists also developed the idea of economic 
nationalism:111  
“The Turkish national awakening in Turkey is the beginning of the 
genesis of the Turkish bourgeoisie. And, if the natural growth of the 
Turkish bourgeoisie continues without damage or interruption, we can 
say that the sound establishment of the Turkish state has been 
guaranteed.”112  
                                                          
106 Ibid., 318. 
107 Akçam (2012), xv. 
108 Berkes (1998), 319. 
109 Akçam (2012), xiv, xv, xvi. 
110 Berkes (1998), 366. 
111 Ibid., 425. 
112 Akçura, Türk Yurdu (the Turkish Homeland), No. 63, 2102-3, cited after ibid., 425. 
36 
 
Some decades later, following a systematic campaign of threats and intimidation 
against Christian entrepreneurs, the events on September 1955 against the Greek 
Christian Orthodox minority and their properties were manifestations of this type of 
nationalism.  
By the end of the Great War, the Unionists suffered a devastating defeat. The 
Ottoman Empire had lost all its Arab land, the Entente powers where present in the 
capital assuming control over the Straights, while Greeks and Italians were planning 
further partitions on the Western shores of Asia Minor. The Bolshevik leaders had an 
ambivalent attitude towards the Turkish nationalist movement.113 The Anatolian 
peasants, physically exhausted and further impoverished by the war, were not willing to 
be involved in any more adventures in the name of nationalist or revolutionary 
ideology. Stirring the ashes, Mustafa Kemal capitalised on these sentiments. He acted as 
the catalyst for the transformation of the Turkish nationalism through a Turkish – 
Islamic synthesis and paved the way towards the establishment of the Turkish Republic. 
The aim of Kemalist nationalism was the identification of the Turkish nation with 
the Turkish homeland, that is Anatolia, and the significant reshuffling of its entire 
population. Kemal realized that the only realistic option for the consolidation of his 
power and for the foundation of an independent and secular modern state was the 
renunciation of any ideology of irredentism and Pan-Turkism.114 The cultural 
unification of the Turks, extending from the Mediterranean Sea to Central Asia, would 
be promoted. The political unification – utopian at the time - would remain only as a 
very distant ideal.115  
The regional environment during the Great War and the Treaty of Lausanne 
The Ottoman Empire entered the Great War in August 1914 on the German side. 
Supported by the military might of his ally, the sultan had proclaimed a jihad against 
Britain, French and Russia.116 On the hand, the European powers managed to instigate 
the Arab Revolt in the Ottoman-ruled Arab lands. The Turkish forces had failed to take 
control over the Suez Canal and few years later, under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk, 
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they were retrieved in Syria and finally in Iraq. In October 1918, an armistice was 
signed in Mudros but the map of Middle East was predetermined in the secret 
agreement of Sykes-Picot in 1916 between Britain, France and Russia.117 As for Cyprus, 
it was agreed that Great Britain would not give up Cyprus without prior consultation 
with France; the control in the region around Alexandretta is thereafter connected with 
Cyprus. The new equilibrium of power in the Middle East had upgraded the 
significance of Cyprus118 as a base for monitoring the territorial gains of the First World 
War, the new mandates – ‘disguised colonies’119 - set up by the victorious Allies. For 
France and Britain, as universal empires, the idea of nationalism and self- determination 
in Europe suited their ambition. They could run their distant colonies all over the world, 
without security distractions, while the emerging nation-states in Europe would act as a 
buffer zone against Germany and Russia.120 To the south-east Europe, the Ottomans had 
been defeated. The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 ended the state of war between 
Germany and the Allied Powers. Under its provisions, sixty million people were given 
their own state but, simultaneously, other twenty-five million were turned into 
minorities.121  
Only few years later, in 1922, the Greek army front in Asia Minor was defeated 
by the Turkish military forces and the balance of powers was overturned. The territorial 
settlement between Greece and Turkey came to a ﬁnal resolution with the Treaty of 
Lausanne in 1923, an arrangement including human and diplomatic-political 
implications.122 A significant number of Greek and Turkish populations were rooted off 
their lands - solely based on the criterion of religion. In Turkey, even though Ismet 
Inönü on his way back from Lausanne was not welcomed by the Turkish Prime 
Minister,123 he had effectively negotiated on equal terms with the winners of the First 
World War, whereas the Greek delegation was confined to opt for “the lesser evil”.124 
The large influx of refugees signified a great challenge along with a sense of grief for 
what was lost forever. For both countries, a process of nation-building and structural 
adjustments was set in motion. In Turkey, the establishment of the Turkish Republic 
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and the pursue of integration through secularization of the state marked an unforeseen 
shift in the country’s history.  
The Kemalist surge in Cyprus 
The Turkish Cypriots had replaced the ‘Ottoman hand’ with the ‘British hand’. 
Their economic backwardness coupled with the advancement of the enosis ideology 
within the Christian community urged them to clung more closely to the new rulers. The 
Great War marked the finale of the Ottoman Empire and posed a serious complication 
to the relationship with the British.125 On 2 November 1914, the High Commissioner 
informed the chief cadi, the Mufti, and other leading Muslims that they were now 
officially British subjects: 
 “[T]hey expressed’, he reported, ‘the view that Great Britain was now 
fully justiﬁed in taking any action against Turkey as was thought ﬁt, 
and ... added that Cyprus should be annexed by England and her 
inhabitants ... released from the intrigues of Constantinople.”126 
Petros Papapolyviou argues that almost 1,000 Turkish Cypriots joined the British 
army fighting against the Ottomans from 1916 until 1919.127  The provisions of the 
Treaty of Sevres in 1919 included the renunciation by the Ottoman Empire of all rights 
and title over or relating to Cyprus. By this time the term “Turkey” is used for the first 
time implying a national Turkish state in Anatolia.128 In 1920, in an article published in 
the Turkish Cypriot newspaper Doğru Yol the sentiment of injustice is described:  
“We know not why the destruction of an innocent & just nation should 
be desired in order to please the Armenians & Greeks whose crimes 
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are quite in the open. It is a great injustice to expect a nation to be 
entombed by its deadly enemy without the nation raising its voice. In 
such case the world which is already in a confused state will become 
more confused & confounded. The earth will again be dyed with the 
blood flowing from the veins of mankind. 
We wonder whether such a scene of carnage cannot be averted with a 
tingle of justice. One must be confident that after such a war peace 
cannot precede justice. Will the Majesty & grandeur of those who 
neglect this point be able to tolerate the weight of their responsibility? 
Poor mankind! Poor & oppressed Turks! Was this to be your fate 
while in expectation of peace and rest?”129 
There is no sufficient evidence to support the active involvement of Turkish 
Cypriots in the war against the Allies. It has been argued that they provided charitable 
assistance to the Turks fighting in Anatolia130 but the political significance of this 
activity remains ambiguous.131 Despite the disillusionment of the Turkish Cypriots, a 
group of young educated people still hoped for the restoration of the nominally 
Ottoman, now Turkish rule. They admired the leader who defied the settlement of 
Sevres, Mustafa Kemal.  
 The emerging differentiation within the Muslim community had similar 
characteristics with the one that had already appeared some decades ago among 
Christian Cypriots. During the 1920s, the collaborationist elite of the Turkish Cypriots 
was challenged by the co-religionist young elite intelligentsia in Nicosia.132 Besides the 
apparent commonalities in the infiltration of nationalist ideologies in both cases, there 
were three important differences compared to the Greek Cypriots: the overall 
underdevelopment, the lack of experience in political representation and the absence of 
a ‘motherland’ willing to support ideologically (and financially) the national awareness. 
The Muslims in Cyprus, though the upper classes were attached to the British rulers, 
when compared to the Greek Cypriots they were still lagging well behind in terms of 
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modernization. The growing popularity of the demand for enosis with Greece further 
deteriorated the competition between the two communities.  
The Treaty of Lausanne had confirmed that Cyprus was not part of the Greek – 
Turkish relationship. Under the provisions of the Treaty, Muslim Cypriots were made to 
choose whether to remain in the island and accept British subject status, or to go to 
Turkey. The colonial government in Cyprus did not encourage them to leave the island; 
only about 5,000 departed for Turkey.133 Yet, the establishment of the Turkish Republic 
was a critical junction for the rise of nationalist ideas in the island. The active 
involvement of Turkey in the internal affairs of Cyprus would take place only some 
decades later, but the impact of the rhetoric for a secular state, the idea of a modernized 
and homogenous nation and the image of power expressed by Kemal Ataturk all 
together fuelled the hopes of many young Muslims in Cyprus.134  
Although Ataturk’s reforms in the 1920’s and the 1930’s gave an impetus to 
change, the Turkish Cypriot intellectuals in Cyprus did not yet consist a generation 
culturally distinguishable. Furthermore, the membership of the Cypriot Muslims in the 
new Turkish world was not given. They had to struggle to draw attention to their 
aspirations, to prove their devotion to the revolutionary movement in Turkey. There was 
an indisputable religious, cultural and linguistic relatedness to the Turkic populations135 
living in Asia Minor, but the Kemalists in Ankara did not view them as an integral part 
of the Turkish nation state – at least not before the second half of the twentieth century. 
Turkish efforts were focused on Anatolia, where the Turks predominated. Mustafa 
Kemal needed a period of peace with the Greeks and the other outside enemies for the 
implementation of wide reforms and for the recovery of the country’s economy after 
many years of war. The Muslims in Cyprus were not abandoned, but they were 
considered to live in a tolerant status under the British rule.  
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If the ‘traditionalist’ Greek Cypriot elite had espoused – rather unwillingly at the 
beginning - the rhetoric of the nationalist faction, the anglophile Turkish Cypriot elites 
remained loyal to the British administrators. Some reactions by the Muslim elites found 
in the British archives are not identified as acts of nationalism; they were suspicious of 
Turkey and unwilling to jeopardize the loss of the institutional privileges they enjoyed 
under the British administration.136 As for the mass of the Turkish Cypriots, irredentism 
was not the driving force for the infiltration of the Turkish nationalism; it was poverty 
and fear that paved the way. M. Zeka Bey in the Söz newspaper described the condition 
in 1933: 
“If we were to say that the current economic and financial situation of 
the Turkish community on the island is dire and, if urgent effective 
measures are not taken, it will not be long before everything that we 
currently possess is lost in its entirety, do not call us an ‘alarmist’ who 
is unnecessarily exaggerating a danger or excessively pessimistic. The 
situation of the Cypriot Turks as a community is pitiful and 
lamentable”.137  
The hope for enosis with Greece had drifted the Greek Cypriots apart from the 
formulation of a common Cypriot identity shared by both the Christian and the Muslim 
inhabitants of the island. The espousal of a nationalist campaign by the ‘Kemalist’ 
Turkish Cypriot faction and the ‘imagined separated community of Turks’138 were 
decisive steps towards the division. The presence of the British - conveniently - 
precipitated this rupture by supporting the distinct collective identities based on 
religious, ethnic and national affiliations.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
The British colonial policy in Cyprus during the first half of the twentieth 
century 
 
The transformation of the Christian and the Muslim identity into Greek Cypriot 
and Turkish Cypriot nationalism, respectively, was a gradual process initiated largely by 
external actors and local elite groups; in any case, it was apparently fostered by the 
British rule. The administrative pattern established by Britain formalized ethnic 
divisions in the island and encouraged communal politicization. The coalition of British 
appointed and Turkish Cypriots representatives at the Legislative Council continued to 
neutralize the Greek Cypriot majority and, subsequently, deepened the rupture between 
the two communities.139  
The policy of intransigence  
On the eve of the new century, the agitation for the Cyprus tribute was 
exacerbated by the rise of the annual tax revenue. In 1904 the Treasury in London 
admitted that Cyprus was paying the highest relative taxes in the world.140 Following a 
visit in Cyprus in 1907, as the non-permanent secretary of the Colonial Office, Winston 
Churchill wrote a memorandum commenting on the situation of the island which was 
treated in London as “an insane minute”: 
 “There is scarcely any spectacle more detestable than the oppression 
of a small community by a great Power for the purpose of pecuniary 
profit; and that is, in fact, the spectacle which our financial treatment 
of Cyprus at this moment indisputably presents. It is in my opinion 
quite unworthy of Great Britain, and altogether out of accordance with 
the whole principles of our colonial policy in every part of the world 
to extract tribute by force from any of the possessions or territories 
administered under the Crown.” 141  
After the Archiepiscopal Question was resolved, the Greek Cypriot nationalists 
would – inevitably - turn against the British administration. On 17 April 1912, all Greek 
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Cypriot elected members resigned from the Legislative Council. Large demonstrations, 
along with the presence of Greek flags and the outbreak of Turkish-Italian war 
deepened the crisis in the inter-communal relations.142 Clashes later the same year broke 
out in a village outside Nicosia and in Limassol. 143 The leaders of the Turkish Cypriots 
felt the pressure and reacted by moving closer to the ruling authorities.144 The large 
number of Greek Cypriot volunteers in the Balkan Wars145 and the imminent possibility 
of a war where the British and the Ottomans would be on opposite sides, intensified the 
preoccupation of the Muslims in Cyprus. This anxiety was not unfounded. Though the 
British were not willing to make any concession to Greek Cypriot demands, in London 
they noted that:  
“the sole use of Cyprus is its possible value as an asset wherewith to 
negotiate [with the Greeks] for more important requirements 
elsewhere.”146  
Indeed, following the Balkan Wars, Lloyd George and Churchill proposed to the 
Greek Prime Minister Venizelos the ceding of Cyprus in return for British access to a 
port on Cephalonia. This proposal soon was withdrawn, but the idea of such an offer 
was reason enough for both communities in the island to rise the hopes and fears, 
respectively, towards unification with Greece.147 
The most important principle for the colonial government was the preservation of 
order – always in accordance with the British interests. Following the annexation of the 
island in 1914, C. W. J. Orr in his work, published in 1918, remarks on the efficiency of 
the British administration:  
“Small wonder that the tendency in a Government office is to treat all 
questions by a reference to ‘previous papers’ and veto anything which 
seems to entail departure from precedent. Nor it is surprising that the 
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type of Colonial administrator most in favour in Dawning Street is one 
who may be trusted to propose no startling new departure, make no 
important innovations and nurse the expenditure of the colony with 
unimpeachable economy…. But now that the island has become part 
of the British Empire it is time to consider whether the Cypriot should 
not be given a more direct share in the administration…… Jealousy 
will no doubt continue to exist between the different elements of the 
population, but this must always be the case in mixed communities 
and is familiar enough in India and elsewhere.”148 
The repeating, and several times, offensive disregard of the Greek Cypriot quest 
for enosis was clearly reflected on the conviction of High Commissioner Goold-Adams 
that the vast majority of Cypriots ‘do not wish for annexation to Greece, and are content 
with British rule if outside rule has to exist’.149 This denial was not the only stereotype 
used by the British officials. When annexation in 1914 could have paved the way for a 
more liberal approach to the expressed will of the majority community in Cyprus, the 
protection of the Turkish Cypriots was then projected as the main reason for rejecting 
any relevant discussion. The British officials continued to rule under the divisive view 
that “the hostility of the Moslem Turk towards Greek dominion is infinitely more deep-
seated than any feeling of the Greek Christians towards British rule”150 and that the 
considerable number of the Muslim community “constitutes a serious factor in the 
consideration of any scheme for handing Cyprus over to the Hellenic Government.”151  
Following the Treaty of Lausanne, the dramatic ending of the millenia-long 
Hellenic presence in Anatolia -with only limited exceptions- put the gravestone on the 
“Megali Idea”. Despite the contribution of the Greek Cypriots in the Balkan wars and 
the Great War,152 their demands were not included in the peace-making treaties. Yet, the 
enosis movement was not fading at all. 
From the onset of the British colonial government, the implementation of several 
administrative methods had a positive effect to the modernisation of public life. The 
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disregard, though, of local requests and realities by the British rule, as Paschalis 
Kitromilides153 points out, diminished any prospect for the creation of a liberal political 
environment. He stresses the importance of the British intransigence towards the 
political and national aspirations of the Greek Cypriots as a significant factor for the 
radicalisation and the undermining of the moderate elements. The cultivation of the 
“Dialectic of Intolerance” alienated the two communities in Cyprus. Gradually, both 
Christians and Muslims, separately, formulated exclusive political trajectories that 
constituted the ideological and psychological foundations of the inter-communal 
conflict. 
Socio-economic developments during the Interwar period  
In economic terms, the two communities, until the 1950’s, can be described as 
completely united and mutually dependent.154 The impact of the Great War on the 
Cypriot economy was severe. The reduced frequency of the sea transportations and the 
shrinkage of the foreign markets had marked a striking reduction on revenues. The 
overestimation of primary goods and the increase of the underemployment of the 
Cypriot labour force worsened the status of the already impoverished lower social 
classes. On the other hand, the Cypriot mules were a contribution to the war in Middle 
East and gave a boost to the economy of the island. Additionally, the wages of the 
Cypriot volunteers in the war, had managed to stop the growing migration flow to the 
United States.155 But these positive effects were not enough to reverse the after-war hard 
reality for the Cypriot peasants. 
Against this background, the economic crisis in 1923 found the Cypriots and 
especially the vulnerable farmers in a helpless situation. Already indebted to 
moneylenders, many peasants were forced to sell their small properties and move to the 
towns to look for work. A population of labourers appeared (semi-farmers, semi-
labourers); the epicentre was the asbestos mines and the lime industry.156 The drop in 
the wages resulted in a life described as “hell”. After a short period of little 
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improvement, the Great Depression and a drought led tens of thousands of peasants to 
bankruptcy and a new influx of day labourers to towns, struggling to survive.157   
The demands for improvement of the living conditions of the peasants were set 
from the onset next to the demand for enosis. As Giorgos Tsalakos contends,158 these 
social demands formulated the political life in Cyprus as they evolved during the British 
rule. Even further, these requests by the Cypriot farmers stood at the epicenter of the 
political calculations of the colonial government but also of the Greek Cypriot circles 
leading the enosis movement. The faction of the “nationalists” infused the enosis 
ideology with a straight connection between the colonial rule and the miserable living 
conditions of the rural populations. Within an oppressive context, the demand for 
unification with motherland Greece was identified with freedom and social justice. 
Therefore, the (inevitable) anti – colonial struggle emerges as the only path towards 
both national integration and prosperity. 
From the 1920’s, though, there was some reaction from the labour and the rural 
movement towards the disconnection between social and national demands. In 1926 the 
Communist Party of Cyprus was founded, based on the principles of the Comintern and 
in accordance with the doctrine of participation in the so-called (and unrealized) League 
of Socialist Republics- and against the enosis.159 In 1925, the first issue of Neos 
Anthropos, the publication of Cyprus’s Communist Party, promoted the idea of 
cooperation between the two communities against the colonial rule and in favour of 
communal justice.160 In the same year, during the second rural conference, the Rural 
Greek-Turkish party was founded by members of both communities who warmly 
supported the continuation of their collaboration on the Legislative Council. When five 
years later, the newly elected Turkish Cypriot Misirlade Necati Noley voted down the 
imposition of new taxes, the British governor suspended the work of the Council 
indefinitely.161 
The number of the Greek Cypriot deputies had been increased under the provision 
of the new constitution promulgated in 1925. Their actions were still neutralized by the 
combined British and Turkish Cypriot votes. Τhe Greek Cypriots thought of this 
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constitution as a mockery and the British governor Ronald Storrs had described the 
whole process as “an exasperating and humiliating nuisance”.162 In the early 1930, a 
new political organization was created by the Greek Cypriots for the promotion of 
enosis. The more radical elements secretly founded the National Radical Organization 
of Cyprus (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis Kyprou – EREK), a precursor of the later 
organization EOKA in the 1950’s. This activity provoked a counter movement within 
the Turkish Cypriot community.163  
The events on October 1931 
In Greece, the stance of Venizelos regarding the island was a very clear one. Upon 
his return to the political scene, the Greek Prime Minister in 1929 had advised the 
Cypriots to pause their efforts for enosis and endeavour to reforms.164 Venizelos was 
decided to build a defensive alliance with Kemal based on mutual interests in securing 
the Balkan frontiers. The threat by the revisionist Bulgaria and the integration of the 
refugees were among the high priorities for the Greek Prime Minister. Turkey was also 
hit hard by the Great Depression: although substantially self-sufficient in foodstuffs, a 
backward and undeveloped industry coupled with a dangerously unfavourable balance 
of trade had put her in a very vulnerable economic situation.165 Both leaderships could 
largely benefit from a period of friendship. Not without reaction within Greece, at that 
time it was politically decided that the topic of Cyprus would not risk the Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement.166 
The political attitude of the ‘National center’ was a disappointment for the Greek 
Cypriots. Yet, this resentment led the latter to the realization that they had to secure 
their own Hellenic goals depending mainly on themselves, not on Athens. When in 
1929 the Labour party won the elections in Great Britain, the Cypriots decided to send 
another delegation to London, asking for more autonomy and for the refunding of the 
surplus of the ‘tribute.’ The Colonial Office insisted on ignoring their requests.167 
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In 1930, both the Turkish and the Greek consul168 in Cyprus were promoting their 
nationalist agendas respectively, fanning the flames of political passions. The public 
dispute between the Greek Cypriot factions – the radicals and the moderates –through 
the press further exacerbated the tensions. Against this background, a set of actions on 
part of the British administration triggered a social outcry. Storrs, a philhellene British 
governor, had succeeded in abolishing the island’s tribute already in 1927, but had kept 
secret from the Cypriots that its accumulated surplus was appropriated by the King. 
Later when this came out, there was strong reaction from all Cypriots. The elected 
Greek Cypriot members refused to agree to additional taxation to balance the deficit. 
The Bishop of Kition resigned from the Legislative Council and along with the 
nationalists he organized protest meetings.169 
On 21 October 1931, a crowd of 5,000 excited Cypriots rallied in Nicosia, 
marching to Government House. They assembled on the forecourt of the residence 
where negotiations began between the leaders and Governor Storrs. When the night had 
fallen, 100-150 teenage hooligans170 threw stones towards the House; the leaders did not 
manage to stop them. They set fire to the cars parked in front of the residence. Shortly 
afterwards, the wooden House was ablaze –not before the Governor had managed to 
escape through the backdoor.171 Rioting broke out in other towns and villages, with 
Famagusta the epicentre of unrest. With the help of British troops and warships, order 
was completely restored in Cyprus by early November. There were seven Greek Cypriot 
fatalities.172 The Constitution was suspended and a strict censorship was introduced. 
Until 1960, Cyprus was governed by decree.173  
The notable cooperation between the legislative deputies from both communities 
on urgent socioeconomic problems had been viewed as ‘a disturbing weakness’174 by 
the British. Following the insurrection, among others, the Bishops of Kition and 
Kyrenia and two communists were deported; some of the them later formed the hard 
                                                          
168 The Greek consul was Alexis Kyrou. He was of Cypriot origin, a protégé of the foreign minister Andreas 
Michalakopoulos. His activity in Cyprus was linked to EREK, defying the policy of Venizelos on the matter of 
enosis. He was eventually recalled, as was his Turkish peer previously, ibid., 30. 
169 Crawshaw (1978), 27. 
170 According to the description in The Times newspaper they were egged on by several priests, see The Times, 23 
Oct. 1931, cited after Holland and Markides (2006), 186. 
171 Richter (2010), 31. 
172 Holland and Markides (2006), 186. 
173 Richter (2010), 32. 
174 Storrs to Passﬁeld, 4 Jan. 1931, CO67/239/14, cited after Holland and Markides (2006), 185. 
49 
 
core of the enosist movement in Greece.175 The Turkish Cypriots, though abstained 
from any participation to the uprising, were affected, as well, by the vengeful measures. 
On 7 November 1931, an article published in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper Masum 
Millet stated: “It is quite clear that these condemnable actions by the Greek Cypriot 
leadership will ultimately destroy the harmony that exists among people on the 
island.”176 The demonstration of the British might in supressing the uprising 
undermined the rising potential for the evolution of this so called “harmony” into a 
political cooperation between the two communities. Α dictatorship was imposed, a dark 
period known as ‘Palmerocracy’,177 a government of extended prohibitions and 
autocracy. It was only until 1941 that the Cypriots would partially restore their freedom 
– limited in local administration and economic activities.  
Meanwhile, in Athens, Venizelos stressed the necessity of the friendship with 
Great Britain and Turkey; he had concluded his statement about the Cypriot uprising 
with a demand to “the Greek inhabitants of these islands that they be less egoistical.”178 
Until the end of World War II, Cyprus was not included in the Greek foreign policy 
agenda.  
The reshuffling of powers in the 1940’s 
Cyprus was involved in the World War II with two volunteer regiments, consisted 
of 25,000 Cypriots from both communities179, that undertook transport tasks on all 
fronts. This contribution was acknowledged by Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
during his visit to the island in early 1943. Despite public statements for a liberal 
management of the Cypriot’s aspirations, by the end of the war there was a clear 
convergence in colonial policy applied by both the Tories and the Labour party: Cyprus 
would remain under British domination for strategic reasons. The planning included 
future autonomy to the island combined with economic promotion; in return, a few 
British airbases would be retained.180 The end of World War II heralded the 
establishment of a new status quo in Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. Great 
Britain, though, continued to govern Cyprus based on the ideal of being ‘masters in 
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their own house’181 but the British power in the region was significantly curtailed and 
the imminent withdrawal from the Middle East was already apparent.  
During the same period, besides the general stagnation emanated from the British 
rule, new dynamics appeared at the island. The most influential of them was the 
foundation of the Reform Party of the Working People (AKEL) in 1941, under the 
leadership of the intellectual Ploutis Servas, sponsored by moderates and leftists. The 
party attracted its members largely from the trade unions, 182 offering an alternative to 
the nationalist faction still demanding ‘enosis and only enosis.’ Ideologically, following 
the German invasion in Russia, as a party with communist affiliations, it was part of the 
anti-fascist front. By the end of the second World War, AKEL was the only well-
organized political party in the island and one of the few political institutions to which 
both Greek and Turkish Cypriots belonged.183  
Greece was drifted within a brutal civil war between communist partisans and the 
right-wing adherents until 1949. In the Paris Peace Conference in 1946, the Cyprus 
question was not discussed. The first attempt to rise the Cypriot issue emanated from 
the Greek Communist party.184 Following a meeting held in late 1948 between Cypriot 
AKEL’s leaders and the leader of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) N. Zachariadis, 
AKEL revised its strategy towards the enosis course. The aim behind this decision was 
to give prominence to the “monarchic-fascist betrayal” and the “selloff of Cyprus” by 
the “civic governments” that failed to claim the island from the British.185 Pragmatic 
members such as Ploutis Servas were ignored. AKEL did not manage to overcome the 
pressure put by the Church and the right-wing propaganda questioning the party’s 
patriotism and its devotion to the popular enosis movement.186 As Sia Anagnostopoulou 
argues, from 1950 until 1955, AKEL failed to the de- religionization of the political life 
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in Cyprus: enosis will eventually be transformed from an idealistic slogan into a 
realistic aim of a, prepared but not politically decided, struggle.187  
The Church was decided to combat communism and to undermine AKEL’s mass 
social basis. The emergence of an electoral politics could challenge its ethnarchic role. 
The senior clergy rejected any participation in the British-led Consultative Assembly 
over self-government proposals (known as Diaskeptiki) and unequivocally declared: 
“[L]et the faint-hearted progress towards Autonomy and we towards Enosis. And we 
shall see who will reach the ﬁnishing line ﬁrst.”188 The consequences of this 
competition and the ensued polarisation within the Greek Cypriot community will 
resurface during the violent clashes from 1955 onwards. 
Important developments also involved the Turkish Cypriot community. Already 
from 1928, the British authorities had abolished the office of Mufti and had put the 
Muslim pious foundations (Evkaf) under their supervision. Following the abolition of 
the Legislative Council in 1931, the mediator between the rulers and the mass of the 
Muslim community was limited to one person, an appointed Turkish Cypriot, member 
of one of the old traditional Muslim families. This arrangement was an impediment to 
the direct influence of the modernising reforms applied in Turkey.189 A group of 
Kemalists in the island, though, was not willing to comply with the old establishment. 
Fazil Küçük and Rauf Denktaş were among its members. Both Turkish Cypriot elite 
groups, the ‘traditional’ and the ‘nationalist’, were distant from the mass of their 
ordinary co-religionists. But the oppression by the British administration had created 
strong sentiments of disillusionment among the Muslim community, which were further 
intensified by the dynamic resurfacing of the enosis movement. Küçük and Denktaş 
marked a shift in their policy towards the defence of their political rights through a 
rather moderate nationalist rhetoric – not anti-British but inspiring enough to encompass 
the hopes of the Turkish Cypriot masses and to mobilise them. Küçük wrote in 1943: 
“For many years there has been a Turkish Cypriot community whose 
members are unconnected and disorganised. Who is responsible for 
this situation? We have to admit that blame does not lie with the 
[British] government or the other communities. We the Turks are 
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ourselves responsible because we have not managed to benefit from 
the rights given to us by the government from the beginning.”190 
A few weeks later, Küçük and other Turkish Cypriot intellectuals founded the 
Association of the Turkish Minority in Cyprus (KATAK), the first Turkish Cypriot 
political organization, encouraged by the British191 as counterweight to the Greek 
Cypriot enosis movement. In Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots who had migrated following 
the Treaty of Lausanne, significantly contributed - through academic institutions and the 
activity of small groups - in diverting the attention of the Turkish government, press and 
public opinion over the existence of the Turkish Cypriot community.192 
As regards to the trade unions, from the onset the Turkish Cypriots were members 
of the Pancypriot Union Committee (PSE) and together with Greek Cypriots were 
pioneers in joint social struggles against the established economic and political elites. 
But the infiltration of anti-communist rhetoric by the conservative right-wing Greek 
Cypriots combined with the rising political aspirations of the Cypriot Kemalists 
eventually undermined the unity of the Cypriot workers. New trade unions were 
founded, manipulated by diverse political powers. The support by the British authorities 
was the catalyst to this rupture and one more opportunity for socio-political cooperation 
between the two communities was lost.193 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
The clash of nationalisms in Cyprus 1950-1960 
 
Internal and external dynamics  
In Cyprus, the plebiscite held in 1950 confirmed the unanimous demand of the 
Greek Cypriots for unification with Greece.194 The incarnation of the enosis movement 
and the new and able adversary of the British was Michael Christodoulos Mouskos, the 
later Archbishop Makarios III. Born of a peasant family at Pano Panaghia in the Paphos 
District, Mouskos was educated in Cyprus, Greece and in the United States. Against the 
ecclesiastic tradition, he was not a militant communist; he (eventually) realised that 
enosis could not be achieved without support from AKEL and, by extension, the Eastern 
Bloc. Makarios built up a wide range of contacts with political and other actors in 
Greece, to draw more attention to the Greek Cypriot aspirations. In parallel, he 
undertook an active campaign to rise interest of the public opinion in the United States, 
through a wide network of local Orthodox prelates and the formation of various 
committees.195 
During his stay in Athens, Makarios met Colonel Georgios Grivas. Upon their 
meeting in 1951, the latter started the preparation of a revolutionary organization and an 
armed upheaval. Grivas, born in Cyprus, was the son of a corn dealer and money lender. 
He was trained in Athens military school and in Paris. He joined the Greek army during 
the Asia Minor campaign and the Greek- Italian war in 1940/1. An ardent anti-
communist, he founded ‘Khi’, a fanatically anti-communist organization, armed by the 
German Nazis and later by the British, on whose part he fought after the end of the war 
at the events in Athens, known as ‘Decemvriana’.196 In 1953, Grivas described the aim 
of the armed struggle in Cyprus as a way to create troubles that would put pressure on 
Britain to negotiate with Greece. But soon this - originally limited – objective was 
exceeded. In 1957, he declared that “the struggle will go on all the way to the end”.197 
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Alongside the internal developments, the international environment formed the 
external dynamics that led the enosis request to defeat and eventually to the political 
partition of the island. The Cold War set the parameters of a new balance of powers in 
the region. Following its accession to NATO, Turkey envisaged an overextended role in 
the neighbouring areas and the integration into the Cold War system by undertaking the 
security needs of the alliance in the region. The Menderes government was encouraged 
by the United States; the Turks viewed this membership as acknowledgment of a 
partnership equal to that of the Western powers.198 
In Greece, the military defeat of the communists in the battle of Grammos in 1949 
marked the end of the civil war but the ‘danger of communism’ was not eliminated. All 
Greek governments were bound by the same basic foreign policy: close co-operation in 
the Western Alliance and the revival of Greek-Turkish friendship in the interest of 
mutual security.199 When Greece joined the Atlantic alliance in 1952, the country was 
viewed by the United States as an appropriate actor in the region to delay the Soviet 
and/or her satellite powers in case of a world war. Within the NATO framework, 
Turkey undertook the operational responsibility to defend the Straights along with her 
sea and land borders with Soviet Union, while Greece would defend the Aegean Sea 
and the Greek- Bulgar borderline. In other words, the two states were strategically 
intermingled, perceived as a united defence space. In terms of location, demography and 
geographic depth, Turkey was more important than Greece for the operational needs of 
NATO.200 It is against this background that the Cyprus issue must be viewed when the 
crisis escalated in the mid 1950’s. 
In the early 1950’s, both Greece and Turkey were preoccupied with the Balkan 
front and for that reason they were ready to overlook the emerging crisis in Cyprus - 201  
but only conditionally. The Turks would react in case of any change of sovereignty in 
Cyprus. In Athens, the government – under pressure from the press, public opinion, 
opposition politicians and Christian Orthodox prelates - was still trying to avoid friction 
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with Britain, opting for bilateral talks with London over the issue of Cyprus.202 In 1953, 
though, when Anthony Eden, as British Foreign Secretary told the distinguished 
military hero Greek Prime Minister Field Marshal Papagos, in offensive manner, that 
Cyprus was non-discussable,203 this moderate policy changed. When Greece announced, 
in early 1954, that it would take the Cyprus issue to the United Nations, Britain 
concluded that friendship with Greece was dispensable should the evolution of the 
Cyprus matter require such a sacriﬁce.204 
The internationalisation of the Cypriot struggle through appeals to the United 
Nations by Greece had failed. The British government, persistently, underestimated the 
dynamic of Creek Cypriot demands, considering that “no organization, no party, no 
funds, no agents, and they will win nothing.”205 Conflict loomed on the horizon, fuelled 
by the use of the word ‘never’ when British were discussing the prospect of self-
determination in Cyprus.206 The pressure from the right-wing of Conservatives in 
Britain played an important role towards this political direction. Furthermore, it is 
worth- mentioning that after the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal, Cyprus 
may not have been the best substitute for Britain’s Suez base lost in 1954. It was, 
though, an important headquarters and radio communications centre located ideally for 
the monitoring of the Soviet naval activity207 and electronic eavesdropping operations. 
The struggle for freedom 
The use of violence erupted in Nicosia on 1 April 1955. The explosion of a 
number of bombs signiﬁed the start of the armed Greek Cypriot uprising and the 
activity of the shadowy organization EOKA (National Organization of Greek Cypriot 
Fighters) under the leadership of Grivas. The operation was approved by the political 
leader Makarios. Within the anti-imperialistic objective, the targets were the Greek 
Cypriot ‘traitors’ and the British personnel, not the Turkish Cypriots.208 The latter, 
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along with Turkey, became actively involved as part of the British strategy to combat 
enosis. The EOKA members were set up against the Turkish Cypriot community as the 
British policy makers made the self-determination request subject to the option of 
partition. Against this background, the Tripartite London Conference in 1955, 
consolidated Turkey’s intervention right to the future of Cyprus.  
What the Kemalist Cypriots had failed to achieve over the last decades, was 
accomplished by the British approach. Turkey raised the matter of protection, security 
and justice for the Turkish Cypriot community: the legally recognised British 
sovereignty and Turkey’s right to protect her own security could not be overlooked in 
the name of the principle of self-determination.209 The expressed will for the promotion 
of her friendship with Greece, along with her role within NATO for the benefit of peace 
in the region, created a suitable context for the international recognition of Turkey’s 
initiatives.  
In Greece, the public began to boil with rage for the withholding of the right of 
the majority of Cypriots to self-determination. The government in Athens found herself 
in a diplomatically awkward position. In Turkey, during the conference in London, 
violent anti – Greek riots erupted in Constantinople and Smyrna. Students, discontented 
peasants from the nearby Anatolian and Thracian villages along with city’s 
lumpenproletariat comprised a crowd of demonstrators that targeted the property of the 
Greek element (and to a lesser extent other non-Muslim minorities) in Constantinople. 
This direct attack by the demonstrators, within few hours, culminated in 16 fatalities, 
200 cases of rape, looting and extensive destruction. The Menderes government 
attributed the attacks to a “communist plot.”210  
Greek Cypriots versus Turkish Cypriots 
Members of the organization ‘Cyprus is Turkish’ were responsible for the events 
in Constantinople, acting as instruments of a plan directed by the Turkish 
government.211 In the same year, ‘Volkan’ was founded in Cyprus, the first 
underground, armed Turkish Cypriot organization. Its aim was (the forcible if 
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necessary) alignment of the Turkish Cypriots with the policy of violent reaction to the 
EOKA activity. In 1956, Küçük, with the approval of Menderes, started preaching 
partition of the island. In 1957, TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization) was set up by 
the Special War Department of Turkey.212 TMT became the sole Turkish Cypriot 
underground organization, its aims not being confined to blocking enosis; TMT’s 
statement declared that: “The Cypriot Turk’s sole representative is Turkey and his cry is 
‘Partition’ and only ‘Partition’”.213 Soon, though, the aim was extended. A new project 
named the ‘Cyprus Restitution Project’ was launched to lay the ground for a military 
intervention and take the island as a whole.214 The political advisor of the TMT was 
Rauf Denktaş. A network was organized by Ankara under the leadership of Colonel 
Riza Vuruşkan of the Turkish army including branches for coordination, training, 
supplies, telecommunication, weapons and logistics. By 1958, the ethnic cleansing 
operation against Greek Cypriots was set in motion through murders, expulsions, street 
fights, destruction of properties and wide spread terrorism over the whole island. Earlier 
that year, Menderes had refused to meet with Governor Foot visiting Ankara. A new 
security assessment concluded that the British had more to fear from TMT than from 
EOKA.215 According to american sources, during a meeting in Athens with the 
Karamanlis government, one British Foreign Office aide admitted that the partition plan 
- once afforded by the British - had been ‘unhappy and idiotic’, but that having been 
made it could not now be repudiated.216 
The appearance of a Governor who “should be seen to treat the Greeks in the 
same way as the Turks”217 remained the overwhelming priority for the colonial 
administration that was struggling for survival. At the same time, in Cyprus the clashes 
had gone out of control. Executions by EOKA members - with recruitment of 
schoolboys, assassinations by TMT, killings of unarmed civilians and counterproductive 
measures like law extension of death penalty, tortures in prison, the exile of Archbishop 
Makarios, the AKEL’s ban, next to cleansing operations, intimidation and life threats, 
plunders, prohibitions, provocative transmissions by radio stations in Athens and 
Ankara, all comprised the reality of civil war in Cyprus. Between 1 April 1955 and 31 
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December 1959, 250 EOKA members, 104 members of the British forces, 51 policemen 
and 288 civilian victims of EOKA lost their lives. 360 soldiers were killed due to 
accidents.  601 soldiers, 206 policemen and 288 civilians were wounded. During inter-
communal clashes, 115 Cypriots - from both communities - lost their lives and 184 were 
wounded.218 Over the next years, many of the protagonists of the events received 
honours for their action. Partition was avoided but, as Heinz Richter points out, “the real 
aim of the struggle, enosis, was not achieved.”219 
The controversial result 
The struggle for “enosis and only enosis” next to the “partition or death” 
campaign led Cyprus to deadlock. Following the internationalisation of the Cypriot 
issue, several diplomatic initiatives failed, revealing the political weakness of the Creek 
and Greek Cypriot aspirations within the world politics and the rivalry of great powers 
in the region. Following the agreements of Zurich and London, after 82 years of British 
rule and many centuries of foreign domination, the First Republic of Cyprus was 
established on 16 August 1960. It was a NATO - inspired Cold War compromise, often 
described as a ‘Reluctant Democracy’.220 All three fundamental agreements, the 
Constitution, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance confined the newly 
established bi-communal state within a circle where any free expression of internal 
constitutional policy or independent foreign policy was excluded. Any dispute over the 
implementation of the agreements was subjected, even unilaterally, to the guarantee 
powers, thus marking the de-internationalisation of the Cypriot issue, with all the 
ensuing consequences.221 Within the island, integration was far from being 
accomplished. Fear and mistrust amongst Cypriot citizens, aggravated by the excess 
constitutional concessions to the Turkish Cypriots - out of proportion to their real 
demographic strength -,222 undermined the arousing of real loyalty to the state. The 
patriotic objectives for enosis and partition, by both communities respectively, were 
defeated, for the time, but not eliminated.  
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CHAPTER SIX  
Conclusion 
 
Niyazi Kızılyürek describes some aspects of the life of the probably most fervent 
nationalist Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Raif Denktaş (born in 1924 in Cyprus) as 
follows: 
“His first dog Rex was a present from family friend, Greek Cypriot 
Giangos. It was a Greek who saved his father’s life. He obtained the 
money he needed to go into business from a Greek Cypriot. In 1964, 
during the ethnic clashes, it was a Greek who sent his wife and 
children to Ankara for their own protection. When in 1967 he fell 
hostage to the Greeks he received much better treatment than any 
other Turk possibly could. In 1970 when his boat capsized in the open 
sea off Kyrenia and he risked drowning, it was once more a Greek 
who saved his life.”223 
Against the fabricated narratives aiming to demonstrate the intolerable 
relationship between the two communities in Cyprus, there is far more evidence to the 
opposite. For centuries, both communities lived alongside each other within the 
medieval context of living and governing a heterogeneous, multi-ethnic and multi 
religious empire.  
When the British arrived in the island, eighty per cent of the people were peasants, 
living in mixed villages, largely illiterate, deprived of any access to power, depended on 
the great landowners and all of them equally impoverished. They were alienated from 
the Enlightenment and all the ensuing developments in Europe during the 19th century. 
Through the well-educated and privileged Cypriots, nationalism infiltrated the island, 
infused with the vested interests of both the traditional and the emerging local elites and 
their rivalries. The two distinct, homogenous cultural-religious communities evolved 
into two national communities, as extensions of two different ‘motherlands’ on the 
grounds of the respectively constructed myths over common, glorious ancestors.  
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The British Governors– with only few exceptions – viewed the Cypriot people as 
‘natives’, segregated to non-Muslims and Muslims. Behind the façade of liberal reforms 
and the establishment of a distorted version of representative government, both 
communities educated the next generations as Greeks and Turks, respectively. The 
growing enosis movement encompassed the expectations of Greek Cypriots for 
improvement of the living conditions by ending foreign domination and by unifying 
with the ‘National centre’ as free expression of the people’s majority. Simultaneously, 
existential anxiety was growing amongst the Turkish Cypriots along with fears of a fate 
similar to that of their co-religionists in Crete. The British refusal to negotiate with the 
Greek Cypriots and the continuation of heavy taxation put forward the most radical 
elements.  
After World War II, the international environment was increasingly affecting the 
Cypriot issue. The internationalisation of the Greek Cypriot request for self-
determination revealed the inherent contradictions of a pre-war irredentist nationalism 
and the after-war ideological context of decolonisation. As the analogy between means 
and objectives became unfavourable for the enosis movement, the Turkish warnings 
were underestimated. The implementation of a short-sighted policy by the weakened 
British rule paved the way for Turkey’s official involvement in the island. The 
replacement of the British ‘protective hand’ by the Turkish one mobilised the Turkish 
Cypriot masses and accelerated the alienation between the two communities in all 
aspects of economic and social life. Against a turbulent geopolitical background, the 
prevalence of radical nationalists within an abortive - imposed from outside powers - 
constitutional state prevented the development of a common Cypriot citizenship and 
eventually heralded the beginning of the end of the long-standing peaceful relationship 
between the two communities of Cyprus. 
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Map of Cyprus 
Source: United Nations 
 
 
 
Map of Cyprus 
Source:www.geographicguide.net 
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COMPOSITION OF CYPRIOT POPULATION 1881-1960 
 
 
Demographic Report 1973, Nicosia p. 30, cited after Lucas Axelos, Κύπρος, η ανοιχτή πληγή του Ελληνισμού: 
αυτοδιάθεση, ανεξαρτησία, διχοτόμηση [Cyprus, the open wound of Hellenism: self-determination, 
independence, partition], (Athens: Stohastis, 1994), 106-107. 
Source: Department of Statistics and Research – Ministry of Finance, Republic of Cyprus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RELIGION 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1946 1960 
 
Christian 
Orthodox 
137,631 158,585 182,739 214,480 244,887 276,572 361,199 441,656 
Muslims 
 
45,458 47,926 51,309 56,428 61,339 64,245 80,548 104,942 
Gregorian 
Armenians 
179 280 517 558 1,197 3,375 3,686 3,378 
Roman  
Catholics 
2,105 
915 824 815 951 851 1,014 4,505 
Maronites 
 
1,131 1,130 1,073 1,350 1,704 2,088 2,752 
Others 
 
800 449 503 754 991 1,212 1,534 16,333 
 
Total 
 
186,173 209,286 237,022 274,108 310,715 347,959 450,069 573,566 
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Larnaca 1878 
Source: www.gundemkibris.com  
 
 
 
Cypriot village 
Source: www.gundemkibris.com  
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Cypriot women 
Source: www.gundemkibris.com 
 
 
 
A Cypriot participating in the World War 
Source: www.gundemkibris.com 
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Waving Turkish and British flags in the streets of Nicosia  
Source: www.gundemkibris.com 
 
 
 
Dr Fazıl Küçük 
Source: Wikipedia. 
73 
 
 
 
Rauf Denktaş 
Source: Aljazeera.  
 
 
A general view of the large crowd out to greet the returning exiled Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktaş 
in Nicosia 
Source: gettyimages. 
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Archbishop Makarios III 
Source: gettyimages. 
 
 
 
Makarios arrives in Nicosia after Lausanne (1959) 
Source: www.anixneuseis.gr  
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Demonstration for enosis by Cypriots living in London. From an article in Italian newspaper 
Source: Salt Galata Archives, Istanbul. 
 
 
An EOKA parade in Nicosia (1962) 
Source: The Times 
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Colonel George Grivas (1964) 
Source: gettyimages. 
 
 
 
An armed priest in Cyprus (1964) 
Source: BBC. 
 
 
Turkish troops in Cyprus 
Source: gettyimages. 
